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Abstract
This Article urges the international use of an expanded definition of refugee because, as will
be shown, the African definition is more reflective of the dominant circumstances currently causing
individuals to flee. Moreover the African definition is more representative of the goals and of the
multicultural character of an international society as envisioned by the United Nations Charter.
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Two unrelated women live in a Central American country in the
throes of a civil war. One lives in the city and is an active member of
a labor union involved in peaceful activities for democratic changes in
her country. The other lives with her family in a rural area making
her living on a farm. The government in question is determined to
quell all civil disturbances and social disorder. It has a two-pronged
plan of attack: (1) to imprison and torture all known troublemakers
such as union activists, and (2) to roust and bomb, at random, rural
villages where rebel soldiers conceivably might hide. As a result of the
government's plan, both women have had friends and relatives, who
like themselves are either activists or farmers, killed. Both fearfully
gather up their families and few possessions and flee to the United
States requesting that they be considered refugees and allowed to re-
main. The urban activist is fortunate. She has brought enough docu-
mentation of her political activities and evidence of political persecu-
tion in her home country that she is granted refugee status. The vil-
lage dweller is told that no law covers her situation, and she and her
children are returned to her village where they die in yet another gov-
ernment bombing.
Both of these hypothetical women are representative of
the plight of hundreds of thousands of forced migrants. While
both would be commonly perceived as "refugees," there is a
disparity in their treatment under prevailing international' law.
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1. Throughout this Article, the author uses the term "international" to denote
that to which the vast majority of countries do (or should) subscribe. Conventions
such as the OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in
Africa, openedfor signature Sept. 10, 1969, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45 [hereinafter African Con-
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Although international law would recognize the city dweller as
a refugee due to her "well-founded fear of being persecuted,"' 2
it would not recognize the village dweller because her fear
stems solely from war and civil strife. Thus, international law
would allow the village dweller to fall through the cracks, sub-
jecting both herself and her family to the possibility of death.
On the other hand, if the two women lived on the African con-
tinent, where regional refugee law encompasses both victims
of persecution and those of war and civil strife, it would catch
the village dweller, thereby saving her life. The disparity in the
treatment of these two women under international law reflects
an important problem in the international legal arena on the
question of who is legally defined as a "refugee"-that subset
of the broad category of forced migrants who are legally enti-
tled to receive governmental humanitarian aid. This Article
addresses this problem and argues that the narrow interna-
tional definition should expand to include both of these hypo-
thetical women, much as African regional law would now do.
The most often invoked definition of refugee comes from
two significant international conventions: the 1951 Interna-
tional Convention on the Status of Refugees (the "1951 Con-
vention")3 and the 1967 Protocol on the Status of Refugees
(the "1967 Protocol").4 The two define "refugee" as a person
[who] owing to [a] well-founded fear of being persecuted
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion, is outside the
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that
country.5
vention] are also international in that they are subscribed to by more than one coun-
try, but they will be described herein as "regional."
2. This type of fear is a requisite element in the definition of refugee under in-
ternational law. See infra note 5 and accompanying text.
3. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature July: 28,
1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter 1951 Convention].
4. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature Jan. 31, 1967,
19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol].
5. Id. art. I, para. 2, 19 U.S.T. at 6225, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, at 3, 606 U.N.T.S. at
268 (adopting definition of refugee~from article 1 of 1951 Convention); 1951 Con-
vention, supra note 3, art. 1, para. A(2), 189 U.N.T.S. at 152. This Article will some-
times refer to "Convention" refugees or "mandate" refugees. These terms refer to
persons who satisfy the requirements of the 1951 Convention or the 1967 Protocol.
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This definition focuses on individual persecution and thus ex-
cludes people fleeing war and civil strife. So, for example, the
hypothetical urban activist would be able to argue successfully
that she is a victim of individual persecution on the basis of her
political opinion. The hypothetical farmer who flees the threat
of war conditions, however, could be returned to her danger-
- ous homeland.
The Organization of African Unity's 1969 Convention on
Refugee Problems in Africa (the "African Convention") 6 de-
fines refugee to include a broader category of forced migrants.
While it includes the definition of refugee found in the 1951
Convention and the 1967 Protocol, which focuses on individ-
ual persecution, the African Convention also includes:
every person who, owing to external aggression, occupa-
tion, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing pub-
lic order in either part of the whole of his country of origin
or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual
residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside
his country of origin or nationality. 7
This Article urges the international use of this expanded defi-
nition because, as will be shown, the African definition is more
reflective of the dominant circumstances currently causing in-
dividuals to flee. Moreover, the African definition is more rep-
resentative of the goals and of the multicultural character of an
international society as envisioned by the United Nations
Charter.
Part I of this Article examines the history of institutional-
ized international cooperation toward refugees that started af-
ter World War I, examining both the European and African
responses. Part II demonstrates that the international defini-
tion of refugee should mirror the current dominant causes of
forced migration-war and civil strife. This Part also illustrates
that formal international acceptance of refugees fleeing war
and civil strife logically follows the current recognition of such
refugees on an ad hoc basis by the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees (the "UNHCR"). 8 In addition, this
6. African Convention, supra note 1.
7. Id. art. I, para. 2, 1001 U.N.T.S. at 47.
8. The establishment of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
.(the "UNHCR") was accepted in principle when the United Nations adopted the Res-
olution on Refugees and Stateless Persons, G.A. Res. 319, 4 U.N. GAOR at 36, U.N.
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Part examines the shift in UNHCR expenditures to illustrate
the shift in the predominance of "non-traditional" refugees
fleeing war and civil strife and argues that this shift should be
reflected in the form of an international convention. Part III
illustrates the importance of the U.N. Charter and its goals.
This Part demonstrates why adopting an international refugee
definition along the lines of the African Convention would bet-
ter serve these U.N. goals, thereby reflecting the multicultural
perspective of a modern international society. In Part IV, this
Article will explore the practical concerns involved in ex-
panding the definition of a refugee. This Part argues that two
major obstacles confronting states that admit refugees, the
costs, both financial and social, and interference with, foreign
policy, can be overcome. This Article concludes that the inter-
national community should formally revise the definition of
refugee, using the African Convention as a model, to include
those groups who flee their homeland due to war and civil
strife.
I. THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION TO
ASSIST REFUGEES
The predominant causes of forced migration are wars,
famine, civil strife, and persecution. 9 Forced migrants-peo-
ple who involuntarily leave their homelands-are generally
distinguished from economic migrants-people who volunta-
rily leave their homelands in search of greater economic op-
portunities."0 Although economic migrants might be consid-
Doc. A/1251 (1949). The United Nations approved the Statute of the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (the "Statute of the UNHCR") by
G.A. Res. 428 Annex, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 46, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950)
[hereinafter Statute of the UNHCR]. Since the Statute of the UNHCR is an annex to
a General Assembly resolution, it cannot bind states. Maynard, The Legal Competence of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 31 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 415, 416
(1982). In addition, the United Nations General Assembly, during the same session
in which it approved the Statute of the UNHCR, passed certain resolutions. See Draft
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, G.A. Res. 429, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 20) at 48, U.N. Doc A/1775 (1950); Problems of Assistance to Refugees, G.A.
Res. 430, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950). See generally
1 L. HOLBORN, REFUGEES: A PROBLEM OF OUR TIME 55-149 (1975) [hereinafter 1 L.
HOLBORN] (detailing establishment and history of UNHCR).
9. See Frelick, The Twilight of Refuge in the West, in WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY: 1987
IN REVIEW 25 [hereinafter 1987 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY].
10. There are arguments against making a distinction between economic and
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ered courageous and ambitious, there is no belief that these
individuals are entitled to receive any aid or support from
other countries." For individuals who are forced to leave their
country of origin, their predicament is urgent (they may die or
be tortured) and beyond their control. Economic migrants,
however, lack that sense of urgency. If they remain at home,
they might not be as well off, but they are not perceived to be
in dire straits. Economic migrants may face poverty, but not
death.
For forced migrants, the world community feels a moral
concern and obligation. The challenge in creating interna-
tional laws to embody this sense of moral obligation has been
to balance the moral imperative to help those people in dire
circumstances with each state's need to protect its own territo-
rial sovereignty and national resources. The influx of refu-
gees, especially in massive numbers, can have a negative im-
pact on the receiving state's territorial sovereignty. i2 Social
conflicts result from nationals and refugees competing for lim-
ited resources such as jobs, education, food, and social serv-
ices. Similarly, political conflicts develop between the receiv-
non-economic migrants. One of the most forceful is based upon the concern that the
exclusionary term "economic migrant" is employed to obscure other political distinc-
tions being made between immigrants. See, e.g., Note, Salvadoran Illegal Aliens: A
Struggle to Obtain Refuge in the United States, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 295, 324-25 (1985). For
example, in the United States, those migrants with the greatest chance of obtaining
refugee status tend to be from communist countries. Id. at 315. People of color from
Haiti or El Salvador tend to have a much lower chance of remaining legally in the
United States. Some observers state that there is certainly persecution in Haiti and
El Salvador, but that the U.S. government is loathe to recognize it both because these
countries are allies of the United States and because the refugees are not white. See
Zolberg, The Roots of American Refugee Policy, 55 SOCIAL RESEARCH 649, 658-65 (Winter
1988) (describing history of U.S. refugee policy after World War II and explaining
role that foreign policy considerations played, revealing that "refugees" encouraged
to defect from Eastern Europe were not politically persecuted or even dissatisfied but
leaving because of poor living conditions).
11. In the United States, for example, economic migrants are admitted only to
the extent that their skills are needed. If an economic migrant has a particular skill
that benefits the U.S. economy, the migrant is welcomed into the country. See T.
ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTINS, IMMIGRATION: PROCESS AND POLICY 156 (1985) (discussing
labor certification requirements of immigrants and the existence of categories or jobs
presumed to be chronically in shortage in the United States as listed in 20 C.F.R.
§ 656.10). In contrast, when economic migrants arrive with common skills that could
compete with native born workers, the United States is unabashedly anxious to keep
them out. Id. (citing Schedule B in 20 C.F.R. §§ 656.11, 656.23).
12. See Garvey, Toward a Reformulation of International Refugee Law, 26 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 483, 495 (1985).
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ing state and the exporting state, such as when the state ex-
porting the migrants perceives the receiving state as aiding its
political enemies or as casting aspersions on conditions within
the exporting state. As a result of these conflicts, not all forced
migrants are admitted.
A. The European Response to Forced Migration
The response of the international community after the
First World War to the phenomenon of forced migration was
to define a discrete subclass of forced migrants as "refugees"
who, in turn, became the object of international attention and
legal obligation. Those qualifying as refugees found them-
selves entitled to help in the form of coordinated efforts by
both the host government and international institutions
designed to work for their benefit.' 3 Yet initially, while efforts
were made to introduce and to coordinate relief'programs, the
manner in which migrants were classified as refugees often had
a distinct ad hoc nature. For instance, whatever large group of
people appeared most to require aid became the definition of
13. Some concerns of refugees, such as freedom of movement, are articulated in
human rights documents that are not specifically concerned with refugees. See, e.g.,
Universal Declaration on Human Rights, art. 13, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810,
at 71, 74 (1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, openedforsigna-
ture Dec. 16, 1966, art. 12, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 176. In addition, many major human
rights documents prohibit the use of torture. See, e.g., Universal Declaration on
Human Rights, art. 5, supra, at 73; International Covenant on -Civil and Political
Rights, art. 7, supra, at 175; International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cul-
tural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, art. 12(1), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 8; Declara-
tion on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 3452, 30 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 91, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975); European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature Nov.
4, 1950, art. 3, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 224; American Convention on Human Rights, Nov.
22, 1969, art. 5(2), OEA/ser. K/XVI/1.1, doc. 65, rev. 1, corr. 2 (1970), reprinted in 9
I.L.M. 673, 676 (1970).
Concerns for the rights of individuals as citizens during wartime have been
largely addressed in humanitarian norms and conventions that pre-date and fore-
shadow the rise of human rights norms and conventions. The more contemporary
Geneva conventions illustrate a parallel growth with other human rights concepts
and prohibit certain types of treatment that would create forced migration. See Ge-
neva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened for signature
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Conven-
tion Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, opened for signature
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
This Article focuses on those conventions and institutions that specifically relate
to refugees.
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refugee. Because Eastern Europeans were the largest group of
displaced peoples after World War I, the reasons for their mi-
gration became the starting point for the development of an
internationally accepted definition for refugees.
1. Post-World War I International Refugee Organizations
The first institutionalized international effort to help refu-
gees was the creation of the office of the High Commissioner
for Refugees by the League of Nations in 1921." 4 The first
High Commissioner was a temporary office charged with han-
dling the problems of Russian refugees.' 5 The causes of the
migration-famine, ethnic and religious persecution, and
war-were not the focus of the High Commissioner's con-
cerns." 6 Instead, the key elements were that those fleeing "no
longer enjoy[ed] the protection of the Government of the
Union of Socialist Soviet Republics and had not acquired an-
other nationality."' 7 Whatever the cause or causes, the focus
of the international community was on the large numbers of
people who were leaving Russia and international refugee ef-
forts mobilized to aid them.
Similarly, in 1938, when the number of Germans fleeing
their homeland became large enough for international con-
14. See 7 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 755-58 (1921) (noting report on question of
Russian refugee, adopted June 27, 1921, that includes resolution submitted to coun-
cil on appointment of High Commissioner); 5-6 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 485 (1921)
(noting U.N. Secretary General's letter on adoption of resolutions to choose High
Commissioner); I L. HOLBORN, supra note 8, at 5-8 (noting League of Nations ap-
pointment of High Commissioner for refugees); UNITED STATES COMMITTEE FOR REF-
UGEES, REFUGEE PROTECTION: AN ANALYSIS AND ACTION PROPOSAL 30 (1983) [herein-
after U.S. COMMITrEE FOR REFUGEES PROPOSAL] (noting establishment of League of
Nations High Commissioner for refugees in 1921).
15. 1 L. HOLBORN, REFUGEES, supra note 8, at 7 (1975).
16. See id. at 3 (noting that 1.5 million Russian refugees resulted from actions of
Bolshevik armies in European Russia, Russian famine in 1921, and breakdown of
White Russian resistance in Siberia); see, e.g., R. CONQUEST, THE NATION KILLERS 13-
21 (1970) (noting that before the 1917 revolution Russia was involved in conquest of
many smaller groups and nations); 2 W. H. CHAMBERLIN, THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION
1917-1921, at 406-07 (1952) (discussing Armenians during World War I and anti-
Armenian pogroms of 1905). See generally 1 L. TROTSKY, THE HISTORY OF THE RUS-
SIAN REVOLUTION (1932) (giving extensive historical background of Russia's revolu-
tion). Russia had a history of persecution of ethnic and religious "minorities."
17. See Arrangement Relating to the Issue of Identity Certificates to Russian and
Armenian Refugees, Supplementing and Amending the Previous Arrangements
dated July 5, 1922, and May 31, 1924, opened for signature May 12, 1926, 89 L.N.T.S.
47, 49.
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cern, the League of Nations (the "League") adopted another
instrument, the Convention Concerning the Status of Refu-
gees Coming from Germany, 8 designed to handle the prob-
lem in a coordinated and international manner. 9 A few years
later, when the flow of Austrians became noticeable, the
League amended this 1938 Convention to handle these refu-
gees as well.2"
2. Post-World War II International Refugee Organizations
The League's attention to the problem of refugees was
curtailed by the outbreak of World War II. Immediately fol-
lowing the War, however, the international community began
coordinating aid for refugees through a series of temporary in-
ternational agencies that culminated in 1950 in the creation of
the UNHCR.2 '
The first of these coordinated efforts actually occurred
during World War II, when the Allied Powers, in an effort to
aid the millions of people who were being displaced due to the
war, established the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation
Administration (the "UNRRA").22 Initially, the international
community's concern was focused on the dislocation caused by
the war. The UNRRA, however, was established as a tempo-
rary agency " 'to plan, coordinate, administer or arrange for
the administration of measures for the relief of victims of war
... through the provision of food, fuel, clothing, shelter and
other basic necessities, ' 23 in addition to the "preparation...
18. Convention Concerning the Status of Refugees Coming from Germany,
opened for signature Feb. 10, 1938, 192 L.N.T.S. 59.
19. See G. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (1983).
20. See Additional Protocol to the Provisional Arrangement and to the Conven-
tion, Signed at Geneva on July 4th, 1936, and February 10th, 1938, respectively,
Concerning the Status of Refugees Coming from Germany, Sept. 14, 1939, 198
L.N.T.S. 141.
2 1. See supra note 8.
22. See The Agreement for the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Admin-
stration, Nov. 9, 1943, in 3 UNRRA: THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS RELIEF
AND REHABILITATION ADMINSTRATION 23 (G. Woodbridge ed. 1950) [hereinafter UN-
RRA Agreement]; see also A. GRAHL-MADSEN, I THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW (1966) 18 (explaining that on November 9th, 1943, the Allied Powers
agreed to establish the UNRRA to help rescue millions of displaced persons during
World War II); U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES PROPOSAL, supra note 14, at 30. The
UNRRA, however, was not authorized to resettle the displaced and had no authoriza-
tion with regard to refugees as such. G. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 19, at 4 n.19, 129.
23. UNRRA Agreement, supra note 22, at 23.
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for the return of prisoners and exiles to their [country of ori-
gin] ."24
The UNRRA was replaced in 1946 by the International
Refugee Organization (the "IRO").25 The establishment of
the IRO represented a shift in concern from the immediate af-
ter effects of the war to refugees generally. Although disloca-
tions of war were of concern to the IRO, the mandate of the
United Nations began to focus on the dominant and specific
causes of forced migration. Categories of people were defined
as refugees, including "victims of the nazi or fascist .... or of
the quisling or similar regimes [which had opposed] the
United Nations, '"26 as well as certain persons of "Jewish origin
or foreigners or stateless persons [who had been] victims of
nazi persecution. ' ' 27 The constitution of the IRO also recog-
nized that as a general matter the specific causes of forced mi-
gration-"persecution, or fear, based on reasonable grounds
of persecution because of race, religion, nationality or political
opinions"-were aspects of the refugee definition.28
The IRO was replaced in 1950 by the UNHCR, and one
year later the 1951 Convention became the instrument that le-
gally defined a refugee.2 9 The 1951 Convention defined the
subset of forced migrants who were to be considered refugees
under the UNHCR mandate.3" In light of refugee flows from a
24. Id.
25. See Constitution of the International Refugee Organization, opened for signa-
ture Dec. 15, 1946, 18 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter IRO Constitution]. See generally 1 L.
HOLBORN, supra note 8, at 29-43 (examining creation and history of IRO).
26. IRO Constitution, supra note 25, Annex I, part 1, § A(l)(a), 18 U.N.T.S. at
18.
27. Id. Annex I, pt. I, § A(3), 18 U.N.T.S. at 18; see G. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note
19, at 4 (noting specification of categories to be assisted in Constitution of IRO).
28. Id. Annex I, pt. I, § C(1)(a)(i), 18 U.N.T.S. at 19. This concern with persecu-
tion based on a particular religious belief or political opinion has historical roots.
The very word "refugee" was originally used in France in 1573 with respect to
Calvinists who were suffering religious oppression. By 1797 the English were using
the term "refugee" to describe American Tories who fought on the British side dur-
ing the American Revolution and fled the American colonies. See Zolberg, supra note
10, at 650-52.
29. 1951 Convention, supra note 3, ch. I, art. 1, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, 152-56.
30. Id. preamble, art. 1, 189 U.N.T.S at 150-52. There was some difference be-
tween the definition in the Statute of the UNHCR and the 1951 Convention defini-
tion. Compare id. art. I with Statute of the UNHCR, supra note 8, ch. II, 6(A)(ii), G.A.
Res. 428 Annex, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 46, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950). See
generally I L. HOLBORN, supra note 8, at 177-78 (noting difference between refugee
definition in UNHCR Statute and in 1951 Convention, but stating that this distinc-
44 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 13:35
number of countries, the old pattern of defining refugees on a
case-by-case basis, such as "Russian refugees," failed to iden-
tify adequately those who should be helped. It was more use-
ful to focus on the various forms of persecution that were the
dominant causes of forced migration and to extend further the
definition laid down in the IRO constitution. Thus, the 1951
Convention defined refugee in terms of an individual with a
"well-founded fear of being persecuted." '3'
Despite the use by the UNHCR of a more universal defini-
tion, there was still an ad hoc aspect to the 1951 Convention
definition. The well-founded fear of persecution that qualified
an individual as a legal refugee had to relate to World War II
or specifically "to events occurring in Europe before January 1,
1951."" The subset of forced migrants legally to be helped
was clearly expected to be a temporary category. Indeed, the
UNHCR was established as a temporary agency, and provi-
sions were made to review the need for its continued existence
in the statute of its formation. 3
In the ensuing years, however, the problems of refugees
did not dissipate. Various treaties and agreements were
drafted and ratified to provide aid to individuals and groups
that did not fit into the 1951 Convention's legal definition of
"refugee." So, "refugee seaman"' 34 and "stateless persons ' ' 35
were defined and given some aid under separate international
agreements. In addition, the U.N. General Assembly passed
tion did not cause concern because all known groups considered in need of interna-
tional protection were included within scope of both).
31. 1951 Convention, supra note 3, art. l(A)(2), 189 U.N.T.S. at 152. For the
language used in the 1951 Convention, see text accompanying supra note 5. Mem-
bership in a particular social group was one category included in the 1951 Conven-
tion that was not included in the Statute of the UNHCR. See G. GOODWIN-GILL, supra
note 19, at 12.
32. 1951 Convention, supra note 3, art. l(B)(1)(a), 189 U.N.T.S. at 154. Con-
tracting parties did have the option of specifying whether the events occurred "in
Europe beforeJanuary 1, 1951" or "in Europe or elsewhere beforeJanuary 1, 1951."
Id.
33. Statute of the UNHCR, supra note 8, ch. I, 5, G.A. Res. 428 Annex, 5 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 46, U.N. Doc. No. A/1775 (1950).
34. Hague Agreement Relating to Refugee Seamen, opened for signature Nov. 23,
1957, 506 U.N.T.S. 125; see 1 L. HOLBORN, supra note 8, at 203 (giving history of
Hague Agreement Relating to Refugee Seamen).
35. Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, opened for signature
Sept. 28, 1954, 360 U.N.T.S. 130; see U.N. Convention on the Reduction of Stateless-
ness, opened for signature Aug. 30, 1961, 989 U.N.T.S. 175.
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special resolutions providing assistance to groups of forced mi-
grants who could not be legally classified as refugees, such as
Hungarians seeking asylum in neighboring countries,36 Chi-
nese in Hong Kong,37 Algerians in Tunisia and Morocco, 38 and
Angolans in the Congo (now Zaire).39
By the mid-1960s, the world community, through the
United Nations, recognized that the ever-increasing flow of
refugees could no longer be tied to World War II. As a result,
in 1967, the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees was
completed and opened for signature.4 ° The 1967 Protocol re-
tained the basic "well-founded fear of being persecuted" defi-
nition from the 1951 Convention but omitted the stated time
limits and allowed for the omission of the geographic require-
ments.4
The 1967 Protocol was a response to the changing nature
of forced migration. It was a positive expansion of the legal
definition of refugee, eliminating temporal and geographic
limitations, while adopting a universal, cause-related defini-
tion. Nevertheless, the 1967 Protocol was not adequate even
for its time. Before 1967, the UNHCR had begun aiding refu-
36. G.A. Res. 1129, 11 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 63, U.N. Doc. A/3572
(1956); G.A. Res. 1006(ES-2), U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 1) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/3355
(1956).
37. G.A. Res. 1784, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 34, U.N. Doc. A/5217
(1962); G.A. Res. 1167, U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 20, U.N. Doc. A/3805 (1957).
38. G.A. Res. 1672, 16(1) U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 28, U.N. Doc. A/5100
(1961); G.A. Res. 1500, 15(1) U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 20, U.N. Doc. A/4684
(1960); G.A. Res. 1389, 14 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 21 (1959); G.A. Res. 1286,
13(1) U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 26, U.N. Doc. A/4090 (1958).
39. G.A. Res. 1671, 16(1) U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 27, U.N. Doc. A/5100
(1961).
40. 1967 Protocol, supra note 4. See generally 1 L. HOLBORN, supra note 8, at 177-
82 (discussing 1967 Protocol).
41. 1967 Protocol, supra note 4, art. I, 2-3, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 6225, T.I.A.S. No.
6577, at 3, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, 268-70. These sections provide:
"General Provisions"
2. For the purpose of the present Protocol, the term "refugee" shall, ex-
cept as regards the application of paragraph 3 of this article, mean any per-
son within the definition of article 1 of the Convention as if the words "As a
result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and..." and the words "as
a result of such events" in article I A(2) were omitted.
3. The present Protocol shall be applied by the States Parties hereto with-
out any geographic limitation, save that existing declarations made by States
already Parties to the Convention, shall . . . apply.
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gees outside of Europe and it became clear after the adoption
of the 1967 Protocol, that these refugees (primarily Algerians
and Tunisians) did not fit the new definition set out in the 1967
Protocol. The largeness of the numbers of individuals fleeing
indicated that the requirement of individual persecution of
which the 1967 Protocol spoke was often inapplicable.4 2 Afri-
cans were fleeing war and war-like conditions related to the
liberation process. Although the number of forced migrants
outside of Europe was quite large when the 1967 Protocol was
drafted and opened for signature, it was thought that once the
decolonization process was complete, involuntary movement
related to war and war-like conditions would essentially end.43
That thought was incorrect, however, and the number of Afri-
can and Asian refugees fleeing war and war-like conditions has'
instead increased dramatically. This phenomenon has led to
the current need to redefine the international definition of ref-
ugee.
B. The African Response to Forced Migration
While European states were hoping that the number of
forced migrants outside of Europe would decrease after the
late 1960s, African states foresaw that the numbers of refugees
would reach a crisis stage by the 1970s.44 Two years after the
opening for signature of the 1967 Protocol, a broader defini-
tion of refugee was needed, at least for the African continent,
and in 1969, the Organization of African Unity (the "OAU")
opened for signature the Convention on Refugee Problems in
Africa.45
The African Convention is a regional treaty developed by
the OAU, the principal political umbrella organization for the
42. Id. art. I, 2, 19 U.S.T. at 6225, T.I,A.S. No. 6577, at 3, 606 U.N.T.S. at 268
(adopting art. I of 1951 Convention without time limits). Article I (A)(2) of the 1951
Convention required that refugees show a "well-founded fear of being persecuted."
1951 Convention, supra note 3, 189 U.N.T.S 137, 152; see G. GooDWIN-GILL, supra
note 19, at 7-8 (noting that size of refugee problem in Africa in 1960s made individ-
ual determinations for refugees impractical and unworkable).
43. See E. Ngolle, The African Refugee Problem and the Distribution of Interna-
tional Refugee Assistance in Comparative Perspective: An Empirical Analysis of the
Policies of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 1960-
1980, at 42-43 (Ph.D. dissertation 1985).
44. Id. at 136 (illustrating that number of refugees reached crisis stage in 1970s).
45. African Convention, supra note 1, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45.
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continent.46 The intent of the OAU was to "Africanize" the
then existing international definition of refugee, as it appeared
in the 1967 Protocol, by recognizing causes of forced migra-
tion prevalent in Africa, which the larger international commu-
nity continued to view as temporary. Consequently, article I of
the African Convention not only covers the individually fo-
cused causes in the well-founded fear of persecution defini-
tion, but also encompasses the refugee who flees war or civil
strife by explicitly recognizing the general conditions in a
country. 47
The African Convention, like other regional and interna-
tional treaties, binds all ratifying parties.48 Thirty-five Member
States of the OAU have ratified the African Convention, 49
which came into force in 1974.50 Beyond the African Conven-
tion's legal force on those ratifying parties, it also carries con-
siderable authority throughout the African continent. The lan-
guage of the African Convention seeks to bind Member States
of the OAU and not just those OAU Member States that ratify
it. 5 ' It is noteworthy that in its draft form, the African Conven-
46. See Z. CERVENKA, THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY AND ITS CHARTER 1-5
(1969). In 1963, only four years before the drafting of the 1967 Protocol, the OAU
was founded. See Charter of the Organization of African Unity, opened for signature
May 25, 1963, 479 U.N.T.S. 39.
47. African Convention, supra note 1, arts. I(l), 1(2), 1(4), 1(5), 1001 U.N.T.S. at
47-48; United States Committee for Refugees, Joe Oloka Onyango, "Plugging the
Gaps: Refugees, OAU Policy and the Practice of Member States in Africa," at 6 (Oc-
tober, 1986). Another progressive aspect of the Convention is found in paragraph 3
of article II, which prohibits rejecting a refugee at the frontier. Id. art. 11(3), 1001
U.N.T.S. at 48. This represents a significant extension of the internationally ac-
cepted norm of non-refoulement. See I L. HOLBORN, supra note 8, at 192. The princi-
ple of non-refoulement prohibits states from returning a refugee to any country
where she is likely to face persecution or danger to her life or her freedom. However,
many states have interpreted this to apply only after a refugee has entered. If a refu-
gee is at the frontier then rejection can occur. See generally G. GOODWIN GILL, supra
note 19, at 69-97 (detailing principle of non-refoulement).
48. See generally I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 603-04,
619 (3d ed. 1979) (explaining role of signature and ratification and pointing to
maxim "pacta teriis nec nocent nec prosunt" as expressing concept that treaties only ap-
ply to those party to it).
49. MULTILATERAL TREATIES: INDEX AND CURRENT STATUS 227 (M. Bowan & D.
Harris eds. 1984 & Supp. V 1988).
50. African Convention, supra note 1, 1001 U.N.T.S. at 46 n.l.
51. Id. art. II(1), 1001 U.N.T.S. at 48. See generally 1 L. HOLBORN, supra note 8, at
188, 197-98 n.35 (discussing the African Convention's use of the term "Member
States" as opposed to "Contracting Parties"). The African Convention's attempt le-
gally to bind states without their express consent is controversial. See I. BROWNLIE,
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tion was signed by forty-one of the forty-two independent Afri-
can states that comprised the OAU in 1969.52
Although the OAU's intent was to develop a regional defi-
nition of refugee, the African Convention ultimately predicted
the course of the world's refugee problems. If the 1967 Proto-
col definition is not amended, international coordinated efforts
to aid many forced migrants might be frustrated. For example,
the UNHCR has given assistance to Afghan refugees in Paki-
stan,53 many of whom would have had difficulty fitting the
1967 Protocol definition either because the numbers were so
great that no individual determinations could practically be
made, or because the individuals were, in fact, fleeing war-like
conditions in their homeland.54 While the UNHCR has some
authority to help such refugees, 55 the constrictions of the 1967
Protocol definition have opened such assistance to attack, for
instance, by the government of Afghanistan, which has ques-
tioned the legitimacy of labelling such people as refugees.
56 If
the international refugee definition followed the African Con-
vention definition, such objections would be unavailable.
II. THE DEFINITION OF "REFUGEE" SHOULD REFLECT
THE CA USES OF FORCED MIGRATION
International refugee law should reflect the current domi-
supra note 48, at 619-21 (noting controversy regarding existence and extent of excep-
tions to rule that treaty only applies to those party to it).
52. 1 L. HOLBORN, supra note 8, at 188, 197-98 n.35. The attempt to bind non-
ratifying parties, regardless of the legal impact on non-signatories, coupled with the
informal approval of the African Convention by the vast majority of OAU members,
indicates the strong influence of the African Convention on the continent.
53. Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 37 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 12) at 70, U.N. Doc. A/37/12 (1982) (listing UNHCR funds expended in
1981 by country, including Pakistan).
54. 36 U.N. GAOR C.3 (53rd mtg.) paras. 1-2, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/36/SR.53
(1981) (stating that since 1979 military intervention in Afghanistan, 2.5 million refu-
gees had entered Pakistan).
55. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 3143, 28(1) U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 84, U.N. Doc.
A/9030 (1973). The General Assembly requested that the High Commissioner "con-
tinue his assistance and protection activities in favour of refugees within his mandate
as well as for those to whom he extends his good offices or is called upon to assist in
accordance with relevant resolutions of the General Assembly." Id. 28(2) U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 84, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).
56. 34 U.N. GAOR C.3 (46th mtg.) paras. 57-58, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/34/SR.46
(1979) (Afghanistan representative claiming that UNHCR assistance to "so-called
refugees" violated UNHCR statute and 1951 convention).
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nant causes of forced migration-war and civil strife. This
would be consistent with the history of international refugee
law, since the definition of refugee at any particular time has
largely mirrored the dominant circumstances creating forced
migration. For instance, when the League of Nations created
the High Commissioner for Refugees in 1921, the High Com-
missioner focused on Russian refugees, then the most preva-
lent group of forced migrants.57 As other nationalities of peo-
ple were identified as being part of the influx of refugees from
the Soviet Union, the League of Nations made arrangements
to include Armenians,58 Assyrians, 9 and others as refugees.60
When large numbers of Germans fled their homeland in 1936,
they too were included as refugees by special treaty.6'
Similarly, the various refugee agencies created by the
United Nations after World War II reflected the changes that
occurred following the war. Initially, the efforts of the United
Nations focused on prisoners of war and other exiles. Soon
thereafter, however, the United Nations redefined refugee and
recognized persecution as the dominant cause of forced migra-
tion after World War II. Yet even after the ratification of the
1951 Convention and the adoption of a universal international
refugee definition that focused on persecution, the United Na-
tions continued to allow the UNHCR to respond to the partic-
ular problems of different groups of forced migrants as those
problems arose, such as with the Hungarians and with the Chi-
nese.62 The UNHCR continues to use its "good offices" to aid
refugees who do not fit into the 1967 Protocol definition-
those fleeing war and war-like conditions-as crises develop.63
International refugee law has always been responsive to the
changing circumstances causing forced migration.
The predominance of forced migrants fleeing war-like
57. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
58. Arrangement Relating to the Issue of Identity Certificates to Russian and
Armenian Refugees, May 12, 1926, 89 L.N.T.S. 47.
59. Arrangement Concerning the Extension to other Categories of Refugees of
Certain Measures taken in favor of Russian and Armenian Refugees, June 30, 1928,
89 L.N.T.S. 63.
60. Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees, Oct. 28, 1933,
art. 1, 159 L.N.T.S. 199, at 203.
61. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
62. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
63. See supra note 55.
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conditions indicates that war and war-like conditions as a cause
of flight can no longer be viewed as temporary and left for spe-
cial resolutions or the "good offices" of the UNHCR. War and
civil disturbances are the dominant and continuing causes of
flight and should be so reflected in the international legal defi-
nition as they have been in the African Convention for the past
twenty years.
A. The Recognition by the UNHCR of Refugees Fleeing Conditions
of War and Civil Strife
The need eventually to expand the definition of refugee
was contemplated at the time the 1951 Convention was
drafted. Even then, states parties were encouraged to extend
the practices of the 1951 Convention to those who did not
strictly fall within its narrow definition.64 In fact, many coun-
tries followed this recommendation even before the 1967 Pro-
tocol lifted the temporal and geographic limitations.6 5 As early
as 1957, the General Assembly allowed the UNHCR to use its
"good offices" to aid refugees who fell outside the mandate.66
In 1975, after the adoption of the 1967 Protocol, the UNHCR
was aiding so-called "displaced persons from Indochina
outside their country of origin."
67
The drafters of the 1951 Convention certainly realized
64. G. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 19, at 13 (noting that Conference of Plenipo-
tentiaries recommended in Final Act that states should not apply 1951 Convention
strictly).
65. Id
66. G.A. Res. 1167, 12 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 20, U.N. Doc. A/3805
(1957) (authorizing UNHCR to use "good offices" to encourage arrangements for
Chinese refugees in Hong Kong). See Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees: Report of the UNREF Executive Committee, 12 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 11) at
Annex I, para. 107, U.N. Doc. A/3585/Rev.1 (1957) (noting inability of Executive
Committee to reach agreement on question of whether Chinese refugees in Hong
Kong fit into UNHCR mandate).
67. See U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/516/Add 1, 44-71 (1975); U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/
INF.147 (1975). The term "displaced person" had previously been used to specify
those who were displaced within their country of origin. G. GOODWIN-GILL, supra
note 19, at 8-9. The UNHCR, while extending its protection beyond its mandate and
the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol definitions, seemed reluctant to confront
this reality, and both the UNHCR and the authorizing General Assembly resolutions
tended to use euphemisms such as "displaced persons" or "asylum seekers" to refer
to these people outside the mandate who were receiving assistance. Id. (citing U.N.
Doc. A/AC.96/516/Add. 1, 92 (1975) referring to "displaced persons and refu-
gees," and U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/544, 87(f) (1975) referring to "asylum seekers").
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that the existing definition of refugee did not encompass all
those in need. Most likely, the definition was the result of
political compromise. It is possible that some felt that refugee
status could be granted selectively on an ad hoc basis to those
not covered by the definition, whereas others felt that the defi-
nition could later be amended to include migrants fleeing for
other reasons.
Whatever the mixture of motivations, the historical prac-
tices of the UNHCR strongly suggest that the ultimate inten-
tion was indeed to expand the definition. Although not all
states followed the recommendation to apply loosely the 1951
Convention standards, the UNHCR almost immediately began
to use its "good offices" to provide aid to war victims. This
expansion of the definition of refugee on the part of the
UNHCR was done with the permission of the General Assem-
bly, which authorized the inclusion of forced migrants not cov-
ered by the 1951 Convention.68 The expansion by the
UNHCR of the definition reflects the approval of the world
community, not just through the supervision and authorization
of the General Assembly, which includes most countries of the
world, but also through the almost uniform support of
UNHCR activities by states in the form of voluntary contribu-
tions to UNHCR programs.69
68. In 1965, the General Assembly eliminated the formal distinction between
Convention and non-Convention refugees with respect to the UNHCR responsibility
to pursue international protection and to provide permanent solutions. See G.A. Res.
2039, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp (No. 14) at 41, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965). In 1975, the
General Assembly gave the UNHCR authority to act on behalf of non-Convention
refugees who were in a situation "analogous" to that of Convention refugees because
they were victims of man-made events over which they had no control. See G.A. Res.
3454, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 92, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975).
69. The UNHCR receives its funding from three sources: (1) the United Na-
tions; (2) voluntary contributions from governments of U.N. members; and (3) volun-
tary contributions from non-governmental organizations. See 2 L. HOLBORN, REFU-
GEES: A PROBLEM OF OUR TIME 1404 (1975) [hereinafter 2 L. HOLBORN]. In part,
every U.N. member committed itself to support financially the programs of the
UNHCR (assuming its continued existence) by approving the provision in the Statute
of the UNHCR that the agency's administrative expenses be borne by the United
Nations. Statute of the UNHCR, ch. III, paras. 20-21 supra note 8, G.A. Res. 428
Annex, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 48, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950); see 2 L. HOL-
BORN, supra, at 1406. The real strength of the support and commitment of individual
states in the world community for the actions taken by the UNHCR, however, is re-
vealed in the breadth and level of voluntary contributions.
In the 1950s, the UNHCR had trouble obtaining voluntary contributions. It was
not uncommon in those early years for the UNHCR to estimate or to target a particu-
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International support for an expansion of the definition of
lar monetary goal to come from governmental contributions and to fall far short of
its goal. Id. at 1406. For the next two decades, however, governmental contributions
increased in amount from US$4.67 million in 1960, dipping down to US$3 million in
1965, and then exploding in 1977 to US$124 million, to US$322 million in 1979, and
to US$418 million in 1980. Ngolle, supra note 43, Table 14 at 98 (compiling statistics
from Reports of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 1960-1981).
In only a five year span, from the 1966-1971, the number of contributing states rose
from 50 to over 80. See 2 L. HOLBORN, supra, at 1406. The greatest portion of volun-
tary contributions comes from Western countries, with the United States and the
European Communities together accounting for over 40% of contributions in 1981.
Ngolle, supra note 43, Table 12, at 94 '(citing Report on UNHCR Assistance Activites
and Proposed Voluntary Funds Program Budget 1980-81, at chs. I-VII (1980)). The
impact of Western states is felt in other areas. With one exception, the UNHCR's
High Commissioner and much of its decision-making hierarchy have come from
Western countries. Id. at 82-83. While concerns have been raised about the political
manipulation of the UNHCR by Western states, scholarly support for this has been
mixed. See id at 146-52. The top twenty contributing countries in 1981 also included
Asian, Arab, and African countries, such as China, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
Qatar, and Nigeria. Id., Table 12, at 94. Certain less developed countries also con-
tributed. Id.
Those countries who receive UNHCR aid also indicate their support for the ac-
tions of the UNHCR, because the UNHCR may not interfere in any situation without
government support and, practically, is not able to intervene without some govern-
ment cooperation. Thus, wherever the UNHCR is able to implement a program of
refugee assistance, governmental knowledge and approval exists, thereby indicating
the support of receiving states for the UNHCR. In looking at UNHCR program ex-
penditures for Africa, Asia, and Latin America, it is clear that these areas represent a
significant portion of the UNHCR program budget. Id. at 116-18 (indicating the
presence of UNHCR programs in Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the enormous
increase in assistance to these areas during the two decades between 1960 and 1980).
The area of weakness in international support for the actions of the UNHCR is
comprised of Soviet-bloc states. The Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies
were opposed to the creation of the UNHCR from the beginning. Id. at 66.
Although the United States also initially opposed the UNHCR, its attitude has turned
into affirmative support. See Clark, Human Rights and the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees, 10 INT'LJ. LEGAL INFO. 287, 290 n. 9 (1982). In contrast, the Soviet
Union and its allies have continued to be relatively antagonistic toward the UNHCR.
Ngolle supra note 43, at 66 n. 12. While the Soviet Union usually does not contribute
to UNHCR assistance programs, the Soviet Union, along with the German Demo-
cratic Republic, did contribute US$445,000 in in-kind services toward boat and air-
lifting assistance in 1974. See Clark, supra, at 305 n.82. (citing 30 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 12) at 60, U.N. Doc. A/10012 (1975)). Other communist countries, such as
China, have contributed more regularly. See e.g. Report of the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 12) at 59, U.N. Doc. A/8412 '(1971)
(listing China's contribution to UNHCR for 1970); Report of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 12) at 73, U.N. Doc. A/37/12
(1982) (listing China's contribution to UNHCR for 1981 and 1982). While there
have been some tensions, a number of communist governments have worked with the
UNHCR to implement UNHCR assistance plans within their borders. Ngolle, supra
note 43, Table 28, at 126 (listing Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Vietnam, Laos, and
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refugee to include war and civil strife victims is also reflected in
statements by both the UNHCR and various non-African
states. In 1981, the UNHCR commented on the growth and
the necessity to afford protection to those not falling within the
UNHCR Statute or the 1951 Convention.70 In 1982, the
UNHCR expressed the opinion that persons not fitting into the
1967 Protocol definition were perhaps not entitled to the full
panoply of rights guaranteed by the 1967 Protocol, but clearly
described these forced migrants as refugees according to the
wider concept.7' In 1985, again the UNHCR pointed to the
growing recognition that persons displaced for reasons of se-
vere internal upheavals of armed conflict deserved to be pro-
tected from danger.72
Representatives of a variety of countries as well as the
Commissioner of the UNHCR have recognized that aid should
be given to victims of war and civil strife. In fact, a representa-
tive of Pakistan at the United Nations indicated that those
countries who had refused to assist such refugess "had for-
feited their right to talk of human rights and of their commit-
ment to the United Nations Charter or other human values." 73
Similarly, in response to Thailand's acceptance of neighboring
Cambodians fleeing civil strife in 1979, the Secretary of State
of the United States described this action as "correct, ' 74 and
members of the U.S. Congress described this action as "ful-
fill[ing] internationally recognized standards for assisting and
protecting Indochinese refugees.
75
China in the years 1976 to 1981). While support for the actions of the UNHCR is
weaker in communist countries than in non-communist countries, there is no univer-
sal negative reaction to the UNHCR among communist countries.
70. See 36 U.N. GAOR C.3 (50th mtg.) para. 2, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/36/SR.50
(1981).
71. Note on International Protection, Thirty-Third Session of the Executive
Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, para. 19, U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/
609/Rev. 1 (1982).
72. Note on International Protection, Thirty-Sixth Session of the Executive
Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, para. 37, U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/
660 (1985).
73. See 36 U.N. GOAR C.3 (53rd. mtg.) para. 2, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/36/SR.53
(1981).
74. 79 DEP'T ST. BULL. 10 (Dec. 1979) (quoting U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus
Vance).
75. See STAFF OF SENATE SUBCOMM. ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY OF THE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., REFUGEE PROBLEMS IN SOUTHEAST
ASIA: 1981 20 (Comm. Print 1982); see also COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, UNITED STATES
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It can still be argued, however, that the approval of the
world community for the activities of the UNHCR is merely
indicative of approval for ad hoc aid and suggests little about
the development of a commitment to consistent long-term aid
for war victims. Indeed, one could argue that there is a quali-
tative distinction between victims of persecution and victims of
war. Perhaps lack "of the protection of [the] country [of one's
homeland]" is the most significant phrase of both the 1951
Convention and the 1967 Protocol definition.76 A religious,
racial, or political group at odds with the dominant group in
political power in their country and suffering persecution on
that basis clearly lacks state protection. War victims, on the
other hand, are perhaps not so much lacking in state protec-
tion as they are innocent bystanders of some internal or exter-
nal conflict in which their otherwise concerned government is
engaged. Victims of war and civil strife may be in an unfortu-
nate situation, but they, unlike the victims of persecution, are
not individuals who lack state protection.
This distinction between victims of persecution and vic-
tims of war and civil strife, although not unreasonable, is per-
haps a semantic one, dependent upon how one defines "lack of
protection." Failure to protect its nationals need not be a con-
scious and deliberate choice on the part of a particular govern-
ment. If a government's intent is not a determinative factor,
then inadequate protection is essentially equivalent to a delib-
erate denial of protection. From the perspective of the individ-
ual refugee, whether she be bombed by her own government
because of her union activity or because of a state policy to
bomb randomly villages in order to flush out rebel forces, her
need to flee to safety is largely the same as the victim of war.
History supports the theory that the intent of a govern-
ment in failing to protect nationals should not control the clas-
sification of such persons as refugees. For instance, when the
world community institutionalized aid to refugees through the
SENATE, 96TH CONG. IST SESS., WORLD REFUGEE CRISIS: THE INTERNATIONAL COM-
MUNITY'S RESPONSE 6 (Comm. Print 1979) (using the 1951 Convention definition but
also including "persons who have left their country as a result of military operations
or civil war").
76. See 1967 Protocol, supra note 4, art. I(2), 19 U.S.T. 6223, 6225, T.I.A.S. No.
6577, at 39-40, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, 268; 1951 Convention, supra note 3, art. I(A)(2),
189 U.N.T.S. 137, 154.
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League of Nations after World War I, refuge was granted with-
out regard to the intent of the new Soviet government.77
Whether because of persecution or dislocation by the revolu-
tion, these refugees were apparently without state protection
and leaving in large numbers.78 Moreover, while some
UNHCR projects to help non-mandate refugees have been
specifically authorized by the General Assembly, the General
Assembly has issued open-ended grants of authority to help
such refugees. For example, in 1973 the General Assembly au-
thorized the UNHCR "to continue [its] assistance and protection
activities in favour of refugees within [its] mandate as well as
for those to whom [it] extends [its] good offices or is called
upon to assist in accordance with relevant resolutions of the
General Assembly." '79 In a similar vein, two years later, the
General Assembly gave a more precise definition of those non-
mandate refugees the UNHCR was authorized to help. The
General Assembly defined such refugees as those with "analo-
gous" situations to that of Convention refugees, that is, victims
of "man-made" events over which they have no control.8 0 The
General Assembly's decision to authorize a broad grant of au-
thority to the UNHCR providing for intervention in situations
where involuntary forced migrants are outside of the mandate
definition is significant. It suggests that the General Assembly,
as the representative of the world community, is moving away
77. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
78. See supra note 16. This is true of most of the arrangements and agreements
developed by the League of Nations: "[A] refugee had been defined solely as a per-
son of specified origin who no longer enjoyed the protection of his government.
Nothing was said of the reason for his lack of protection." 1 L. HOLBORN, supra note
8, at 74.
79. G.A. Res. 3143, 28(1) U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 84, U.N. Doc. A/9030
(Dec. 14, 1973) (emphasis added); see G. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 19, at 10 n.37
(citing this resolution and noting subsequent relevant resolutions).
80. G.A. Res. 3454, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 92, U.N. Doc. A/10034
(1975). The focus on "man-made" events is most likely to distinguish war victims
from famine victims. Famine victims do tend to command the attention of their
home governments in a way that neither persecuted groups nor casualties of war and
civil strife do. Moreover, it is possible to import foodstuffs and development tech-
niques, whereas it is impossible to "import" tolerance or peace. It is important to
note, though, that sometimes famines are man-made, generally- in civil war situations
where food is used by governments as a weapon. See, e.g., Bazyler, Reexamining the
Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in Light of the Atrocities in Kampuchea and Ethiopia, 23
STAN. J. INT'L L. 547, 554-64 (1987) (discussing Ethiopian government's selective
distribution of food to non-rebel areas).
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from a policy of ad hoc assistance and towards a policy of con-
sistent assistance by using an expanded definition of refugee.
Such a revised definition focuses not on the intent of govern-
ment, but rather on whether the cause is man-made and be-
yond the control of the migrant.
These UNHCR statements, in addition to the UNHCR's
continued practice of using its "good offices" to recognize ref-
ugees not covered by the 1967 Protocol definition, indicate
that the time is ripe for expanding the definition of refugee.
B. The Shift in UNHCR Expenditures Reflects a Shift in the
Causes of Forced Migration
The change in the conditions creating refugees is best evi-
denced by the shift in UNHCR expenditures over time from
European states to African and Asian states. In 1963, Euro-
pean states received approximately 51% of UNHCR total ex-
penditures, whereas African states received 24% and Asian
states received 12% .8 The European percentage continued to
drop to a low of 7% in 1970 and in 1971.82 At the same time,
the African share of UNHCR expenditures increased from
24% in 1963, climbing to a high of 68% in 1969 and in 1970.83
Since 1970, the African percentage fell from a high of 59% in
1971 to a low of 23% in 1976 and ended in 1980 at 34% of
total UNHCR expenditures.84 Over the same period of time,
the percentage of UNHCR expenditures going to Asian coun-
tries after 1963 fluctuated between 8% (1964, 1968, 1969) and
22% (1971).' 5 The Asian share fluctuated at a higher level in
the 1970s-between 14% (1977) and 34% (1978)-and then
dramatically increased to 60% (1979).86
UNHCR resource expenditures have generally tracked the
shifts in geographic distribution of refugees in the world.
From 1975 to 1980, Africa accounted for a low of 19.9% of all
81. E. Ngolle, supra note 42, Table 23, at 115 (compiling statistics from U.N.
General Assembly, Reports of the UNHCR, 1963-1980; Reports on Assistance Activi-






86. Id. This Asian share fell only slightly in 1980 to 55%. Id.
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refugees in 1975 to a high of 72.2% in 1977 and dropped to a
still hefty 58.4% of all refugees in 1980.87 At the same time,
Asia accounted for a high of 67.8% of all refugees in 1975 to a
low of 10.8% in 1978 and rose to 29.3% in 1980.88
An examination of these UNHCR expenditures indicates
both the willingness of the UNHCR to give aid to those refu-
gees who do not fit into the traditional definition and the tre-
mendous increase in the percentage of "non-traditional" Afri-
can and Asian refugees fleeing "civil wars, ethnic conflicts,
wars of liberation and natural catastrophe. 89
In the 1980s, the number of refugees fleeing conditions of
war and civil strife has continued to increase. 90 For example,
in 1987 almost half of the world's twelve million refugees were
Afghans residing in Pakistan, which is the country with the
largest refugee population in the world.91 While the Pakistani
government and the world community, through both direct
contributions and the work of the UNHCR, have been respon-
sive, thereby recognizing an international obligation to aid
these migrants, these migrants are not people who fit into the
strict constructs of the 1967 Protocol definition. The Afghan
refugee movement started in late 1979, following civil strife re-
lated to the takeover by a leftist group on April 27, 1978.2
While some movement could be attributed to political persecu-
tion as the new Kabul government repressed dissent, part of
the government's response to the disorder were general at-
tacks and bombings of villages." On Christmas Eve 1979, the
87. Id., Table 25, at 119 (compiling statistics from Yearbook of United Nations,
1970-80)
88. Id.
89. Id. at 145.
90. This is not to suggest that no modern refugee movements have resulted
from persecution. Persecution has caused the migration not only of individuals, but
of populations, for example, in Uganda under Idi Amin. In 197 I, Ugandan President
Obote was overthrown in a coup d'etat led by Idi Amin. See T. AVIRGAN & M.
HONEY, WAR IN UGANDA, THE LEGACY OF IDI AMIN 4 (1982). In 1972, Amin gave all
non-citizen Asians three months to leave the country, and in the ensuing panic, most
of Uganda's 80,000 Indians, including 20,000 citizens, fled the country. Id. at 4-5.
Amin oversaw acts of widespread torture and murder as he purged Langi and Acholi
tribes. Id. at 31 The Amin regime came to an end in 1979. Id. at 132-54.
91. See Dupree, Afghan Refugees in Pakistan, in 1987 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY,
supra note 9, at 17.
92. Id.
93. Id.
58 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 13:35
Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, and the numbers of Afghan
refugees fleeing into Pakistan increased dramatically,94 clearly
in response to the war raging in their country.
Indeed, the trend of increasing numbers of refugees flee-
ing due to war and civil strife has continued. In 1987, seven
countries and the Palestinian nation each produced in excess
of 200,000 refugees.9 5 Afghanistan headed the list with some
5,751,000 refugees.96  Palestinians ranked second with
2,217,805 refugees.97 Ethiopia, whose refugees would appear
to fit into the 1967 Protocol definition, ranked third with
1,122,300 refugees. 98 While several thousand Ethiopians have
been voluntarily repatriated through UNHCR efforts, others
continue to flee due to human rights abuses by their govern-
ment.9 9 Mozambique ranked fourth with 917,000 refugees.' 00
Refugees from Mozambique were not fleeing persecution at
the hands of their own government, but fleeing civil strife cre-
ated by the conflict between the South African-backed insur-
gents and the government of Mozambique.' 0 ' Ranking behind
Mozambique was a third African state, Angola, which gener-
ated 404,000 refugees.1 0 2 Here, too, refugees, and others in-
ternally displaced, were fleeing not persecution, but war-torn
94. Id.
95. Id. at 33. The seven countries are Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Mozambique, An-
gola, Iraq, Cambodia, and the Sudan. Id. In 1988, the number of countries in-
creased to ten. See WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY: 1988 IN REVIEW 35 (listing Afghanistan,
Mozambique, Ethiopia, Iraq, Angola, Sudan, Cambodia, Somalia, Iran, and Rwanda).
96. 1987 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY, supra note 9, at 33.
97. Id. The international community has long viewed Palestinians as unique and
early on created the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees
in the Near East (the "UNRWA"), a separate international organization to provide
relief efforts for Palestinian refugees. G.A. Res. 302, U.N. Doc. A/1237 (1949). But
it is important to note that. Palestinian displacement is a product of war.
98. 1987 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY, supra note 9, at 33.
99. Id. at 38.
100. Id. at 33.
101. Id. at 40. Kidnapping, torture, disfigurement, and rape at the hands of
armed bandits and South African-backed insurgents might arguably fit under an in-
terpretation of the 1967 Protocol definition that allows for persecution at the hands
of a non-governmental entity that the government is unwilling or unable to control.
See Brennan, Mozambicans: A People at Risk, in 1987 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY, supra
note 9, at 41. Still, the situation for Mozambicans does not fit into the notion of
individual persecutions as defined by the 1967 Protocol definition because the rea-
sons for their ill-treatment were not based on race, ethnicity, or politics, but were
part of a war strategy of terror on the part of the insurgents. Id.
102. 1987 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY, supra note 9, at 33.
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conditions as a result of the Angolan civil war that has plagued
that country almost since its independence in 1975.103 Rank-
ing behind Angola was Iraq, which generated some 400,000
refugees.' 0 4 Here again, refugees were fleeing .war conditions
created by the war between Iraq and Iran.
10 5
Ranking behind Iraq was Cambodia, which generated
314,450 refugees.' 0 6 These refugees, trapped along the bor-
der between Thailand and Cambodia, encompassed both those
fleeing government persecution and those fleeing severe
drought conditions. 0 7 But in addition to these factors, the oc-
cupation of Cambodia by Vietnam and the presence of Khmer
Rouge troops waging guerilla warfare cannot be ignored.
Sudan ranked behind Cambodia, generating 205,000 refu-
gees.'0 8 Sudanese refugees have fled their homes in part be-
cause of food shortages and in part because of civil strife be-
103. Id. at 35-36. .In 1987, Angola not only generated refugees but also received
refugees in smaller numbers from Namibia, South Africa, and Zaire. Id. Refugees
from Namibia were fleeing war conditions in that country created by the South West
African Peoples Organization's ("SWAPO") continuing war for independence against
South African occupation. See id. at 36.
South African refugees are harder to classify. Arguably they might be consid-
ered Convention refugees based upon the apartheid or racial conditions existing in
South Africa or based upon a theory of political persecution, i.e., that those who sup-
port democracy in South Africa are singled out for persecution by the government..
See, e.g., 1 L. HOLBORN, supra note 8, at 189 (arguing there is "little question" that
refugees in southern Africa and those in the then-Portuguese controlled colonies
were persecuted). On the other hand, in 1987, the approximately 16 South African
refugee camps that existed in Angola were administered by the African National Con-
gress (the "ANC"), which is seeking to overthrow the white minority regime in South
Africa. See 1987 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY, supra note 9, at 36. The ANC sees itself
engaged in an armed struggle against the South African government. Whether free-
dom fighters can be refugees has been uncertain. The UNHCR has long been under-
stood to exclude freedom fighters, while the OAU has included them. See 1 L. HOL-
BORN, supra note 8, at 190-91. However they be defined, both the Angolan govern-
ment and the UNHCR have responded to their needs. 1987 WORLD REFUGEE
SURVEY, supra note 9, at 36.
104. 1987 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY, supra note 9, at 33.
105. See Smith, Living with War and Revolution, TIME, Aug. 17, 1987, at 32 (noting
the large number of refugees from Iran who are "draft dodgers"); Kopvillem, Refu-
gees from Iran, MACLEAN'S, Feb. 2, 1987, at 29-30 (noting that while some educated
and secular Moslems and ethnic minorities flee persecution, many admit fleeing be-
cause of war). But cf. Darnton & Field, Ticket to Loneliness, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 28, 1989,
at 43 (noting drop in refugees in West Germany from Iraq-Iran region since cease-
fire).
106. 1987 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY, supra note 9, at 33.
107. Id. at 46.
108. Id. at 33.
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tween the Sudanese government and the Sudanese People's
Liberation Army.10 9 In addition, Sudan is a resting place for a
number of refugees generated by other countries. Most of
these are northern Ethiopians who have been fleeing war con-
ditions since 1967 as the Ethiopian government has battled
both the Eritrean People's Liberation Front and the Tigray
People's Liberation Front.t"0 Migrants from Chad and Uganda
have also sought refuge in Sudan due to civil strife in their re-
spective homelands."'
The bulk of forced migrants no longer originate in Euro-
pean countries, but rather they come from Africa and Asia.
They are most often not fleeing individual persecution, but
rather war and war-like conditions. This represents a change
from the "model refugee" as initially defined after World War
II in the 1951 Convention and in the 1967 Protocol. At the
time these instruments were drafted; migration because of war
and civil strife had not been great enough to impact the institu-
tionalized international efforts to aid refugees. This situation,
however, has clearly changed, and the time has come to revise
the definition of refugee to include forced migrants fleeing war
and civil strife.
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE U.N. CHARTER
AND AN EXPANDED INTERNATIONAL
DEFINITION OF REFUGEE
A. The U.N. Charter Reflects International Concerns
Expanding the definition of refugee to include victims of
war and civil strife is not only consistent with the historical de-
velopment of international refugee law and reflective of the
current causes of forced migration, but it is also consistent
with the three major goals that form the humanitarian pur-
poses embodied in the U.N. Charter (the "Charter"): (1)
peace, (2) human rights, and (3) formal equality and self-deter-
mination.' 12
The policy-oriented view used in this Article to define the
109. Id. at 42.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, paras. 1-3, art. 2, para. 1. See infra notes 126, 128, &
133-34 for the text of'these paragraphs.
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concept of refugee incorporates the goals of the U.N. Charter,
the constitutive document of the United Nations." l3  The
United Nations and the Charter are significant because their
creation represented a major shift in international relations
and in international law." 4
The United Nations is the first international organization
to acquire virtually world-wide membership and universal ju-
risdiction over all member nations." 5 The United Nations was
not the first attempt at institutionalized international coopera-
tion. After the First World War, the victors of that War at-
tempted to establish such an institution by creating the League
of Nations. However, the League of Nations was destroyed by
the outbreak of World War II and never did achieve wide-
spread membership."16
The United Nations, while it reflects the political triumph
of the Allied Powers, also symbolizes a consensus reached on
certain aspirations. The main underlying concern is that of in-
113. This policy-oriented or teleological methodology rejects the notion that
legal rules are neutral and objective. See generally Note, 'Round and 'Round the Bramble
Bush: From Legal Realism to Critical Legal Scholarship, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1670-76
(1982). It is not that the rules (themselves a reflection of policy considerations) are
to be ignored, but rather that, in legal analysis, rules and policy considerations both
should be consciously considered as being integral to the legal process. See Higgins,
Policy Considerations and the International Judicial Process, 17 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 58
(1968). Some positivist or formalist scholars would disagree with this approach. For
a discussion of the criticism of the formalist position, see generally id.
114. See Anand, R6le of the "New" Asian-African Countries in the Present International
Legal Order, 56 AM.J. INT'L L. 383, 384 (1962) (suggesting that in United Nations one
sees "for the first time in history, a general international organization which for all
practical purposes, is of a world-wide character"). See generally 228 THE ANNALS OF
THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE, THE UNITED NATIONS
AND THE FUTURE (E. Patterson ed. 1943) (addressing key issues faced by the United
Nations upon its inception).
115. The United Nations includes 159 member nations, representing 98% of
the world's population. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASSOCIATIONS, INTERNATIONAL ORGANI-
ZATIONS 682 (1989).
116. See, e.g., H. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS 463-66 (5th ed. rev.
1978) (noting structural weaknesses of League of Nations). Morgenthau points out
that the League of Nations was unable to attract some of the contemporary great
powers, most notably the United States. Id. at 464. This is most ironic, given the
active participation of U.S. President Woodrow Wilson in the development of the
League of Nations. See, e.g., Humphrey, The International Law of Human Rights in the
Middle Twentieth Century, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND
POLICY 2-3 (R. Lillich & E. Newman ed. 1979). The inability of the League of Nations
to attract the great powers contributed to its inability to prevent the wars that oc-
curred during its existence. See MORGENTHAU, supra, at 464-66.
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ternational harmony." 7 The United Nations was established
by the victors of the Second World War as an effort to maintain
the newly attained status quo." 8 The structure of the organi-
zation reveals that the great powers that emerged from World
War II expected to maintain their global authority.
The United Nations is organized into six basic organs, of
which two are most important: the General Assembly and the
Security Council. " 9 Of these two bodies, the Security Council
is the more powerful, having the authority to take action, in-
cluding economic boycotts and mobilization of armed forces,
for the preservation of world peace and security.' 20 The Se-
curity Council, however; is also the less democratic of the two
bodies. While the General Assembly is open to all members of
the United Nations, the Security Council is open to only eleven
members. 2 1 Five of these eleven members, the United States,
the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic
of China, and France, are permanent members. 22 In order to
enable each of these five members to assert control of the Se-
curity Council, all non-procedural decisions made by the Se-
curity Council must be made with their unanimous ap-
proval. 2 3  These five permanent members, however, also
chose to share power with the general membership of the
United Nations. 2 4  Even in the powerful Security Council,
117. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 4 ("Purpose and Principles: The purposes of
the United Nations are: ... 4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations
in attainment of ... common ends").
118. See MORGENTHAU, supra note 116, at 101 (arguing that United Nations was
intended to serve as an instrument of China, France, Great Britain, Soviet Union,
United States, and their allies, for maintaining status quo after World War II).
119. U.N. CHARTER arts. 9-32.
120. Id. art. 24, para. 1, arts. 41-42.
121. Id. art. 23, para. 1.
122. Id.
123. Id. art. 27, para. 3.
124. Arguably, the victors had no choice but to choose a cooperative and co-
optive model of global rule. Sheer force can be an expensive and eviscerating propo-
sition against smaller but determined opponents even for powerful states. Nonethe-
less, the self-interest involved in choosing a cooperative institutional model does not
undermine the value of the aspirations. While the victors themselves, having created
the relatively new structure, may have a clear view of the manipulability and nature of
the goals, succeeding generations often "approach these rules as facts of interna-
tional life given to them by their forebears and sanctified by the passage of time." See
F. A. BOYLE, WORLD POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 162 (1985). While the goals
of the United Nations, then, are hardly immune from political manipulation and
machination and do not take on a life of their own, they do interact and impact upon
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while all five permanent members must agree on non-proce-
dural actions, at least two of the non-permanent members
must also concur. 2 5 This underlying concern for international
harmony is furthered by the three goals of the U.N. Charter.
1. The Three Goals of the U.N. Charter
a. Maintaining International Peace
The first goal of the United Nations is to maintain interna-
tional peace. 126 After two world wars, it is not surprising that
the victorious states, as well as other states in the world, were
left with an increased concern for peace. Indeed, it is likely
that the desire to share power with all the other countries in
the world was fueled by this concern for peace. An illustration
of the international community's concern for peace after
World War II are the activities the United Nations committed
itself to monitor and to resolve. The United Nations commit-
ted itself to prevent not just the outbreak of war, but any
number of activities that could lead to war. It focused on "ag-
gression" and "breaches of the peace" short of war as well as
on all other "international disputes or situations which might
lead to a breach of the peace. "127 The Charter laid the
groundwork for the monitoring of a broad range of activities
that were short of war but portended war.
b. Promoting Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
The second goal of the United Nations is to promote
the way nations (and individuals) behave in the international context. For an analo-
gous discussion (and debate) on the tensions between power politics and the power
of ideas in the civil rights context see generally Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrench-
ment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331
(1988).
125. U.N. CHARTER art. 27, para. 3.
126. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1. This paragraph states that one of the pur-
poses of the United Nations is
[t]o maintain international peace and security and to that end: to take effec-
tive collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the
peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the
peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the
principles ofjustice and international law, adjustment or settlement of inter-
national disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.
127. Id.
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human rights and fundamental freedoms for all.' 28  The
"new"i29 concern for human rights and fundamental freedoms
enshrined in the U.N. Charter grew out of the international
horror at Nazi Germany's extermination of Jews and other
"undesirable" individuals. °3 0 Genocidal treatment of minori-
ties, particularly religious minorities, had been a recurring
problem in late nineteenth and early twentieth century Euro-
pean history and had been addressed by the international com-
munity in an ad hoc fashion through bilateral and multilateral
treaties.' 3  The enshrinement by the United Nations of re-
spect for human rights in its Charter elevated that concern to a
global one.
Making violations of the human rights of individuals and
groups of individuals a subject of international concern was a
new way to handle an old problem, but it also represented a
major shift for international law. Before World War II, the
subject of international law concerned relationships among
states, not a state's treatment of its own nationals. Making
human rights a global concern paved the way for the incorpo-
ration of such individual rights into international law. 13 2
c. Fostering Formal Equality and Self-Determination
The third goal of the United Nations is to foster the equal-
ity of all nations 33 and the right of self-determination of all
128. Id. art. 1, para. 3. This paragraph states that one of the purposes of the
United Nations is "[tlo achieve international cooperation in solving international
problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character, and in promot-
ing and encouraging respect for human rights and for the fundamental freedoms for
all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion." Id.
129. The author uses the term "new" as regards a global concern for human
rights. It should be noted, however, that Latin American countries have had a re-
gional interest in human rights issues that predates the foundation of the United
Nations. See T. BUERGENTHAL, R. NOiRIS, D. SHELTON, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS
IN THE AMERICAS 2-3 (2d ed. 1986). See generally, T. FARER, THE GRAND STRATEGY OF
THE UNITED STATES IN LATIN AMERICA 63-124 (1988) (discussing the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights and human welfare issues regarding the United States
and Latin America).
130. During the Nazi period, other "undesirable" individuals included homo-
sexuals, Poles, and others. See, R. BLEIER, SCIENCE AND GENDER 11 (1984).
131. See Humphrey, supra note 116, at 1-3.
132. See id. at 5.
133. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 1. This paragraph states that "[t]he organiza-
tion is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members." Id.
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peoples. 3 '4 The concept of the formal equality of all nations is
not only stated in the U.N. Charter but is embodied in part of
the structure of the United Nations. While the Security Coun-
cil, by its structure, recognized and solidified the then current
practical inequalities of nations, the General Assembly, with its
democratic inclusion of all nations with equal voices, recog-
nized and solidified the political aspiration of formal equality.
The recognition of the formal equality of states developed as
the new unifying force for international peace and coopera-
tion.
The rise of nationalism also engendered self-determina-
tion, the corollary to the concept of formal equality." 5 The
term self-determination originally appeared during World War
I and was used to justify the liberation of Central and Eastern
European peoples from foreign domination, 3 6 but was not ap-
plied to colonized Africans. Its inclusion in the Charter re-
flected and foretold of the increasing universality of the con-
cept. The Charter created, as one of its principal organs, a
Trusteeship Council. 37  The Trusteeship Council was
designed to oversee the administration of trust territories and,
among other things, to "promote the political, economic, so-
cial, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the
trust territories, and their progressive development toward
self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the
134. Id. art. 1, para. 2. This paragraph states that one of the purposes of the
United Nations is "[to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other
appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace." Id.
135. Professor Hans Morgenthau has attributed this appearance of the concept
of formal equality to the decline of the "international society." See H. MORGENTHAU,
supra note 116, at 254-57. Morganthau sees, in spite of the wars and competitiveness
amongst European nations, a fairly homogeneous international society in Europe
that politically dominated the globe. Id. at 255, 357. The community of heads of
states and foreign service diplomats viewed their allegiance to a broader interna-
tional community rather than to their individual countries, and much of the direct
aggressive competitiveness that European states held towards each other was di-
rected into the colonization of so-called "politically empty spaces" in Africa, Asia,
and the Americas. Id. at 357-59.
In Morgenthau's view, the rise of nationalism led to the decline of the interna-
tional society. Id. at 254-57. The foreign service and diplomatic community frag-
mented itself toward individual states to the detriment of the unifying values of the
international society. Id. at 256-57.
136. Id. at 100.
137. U.N. CHARTER art. 7, para. 1.
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particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and
the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned."'' 38
Colonialism was hardly denounced, but the logical conclusion
of the supposed benefits of trusteeship-self-government or
independence-was finally enshrined as an international goal.
2. The Development of the Three Goals of the U.N. Charter
The three goals of the U.N. Charter have endured and ad-
justed to changing circumstances. The first goal, maintaining
international peace, has continued to be of paramount con-
cern. While peace has not always been successfully main-
tained, the world has avoided, so far, a third world war.13 9
One significant development is that the broad range of activity
monitored by the United Nations as possibly portending war
has come to include some egregious human rights violations.
The involvement of the United Nations in the independence
movement in Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia) is an example. The
efforts of the United Nations in encouraging the United King-
dom to grant Rhodesia independence was an aspect of its re-
sponsibility over non-self-governing territories as well as evi-
dence of its commitment to eradicate human rights violations,
which involved racially discriminatory policies."'4 Even after
the white minority regime in power declared unilateral inde-
pendence in 1962, the United Nations continued to press for
the eradication of racial discrimination. In fact, the Security
Council went so far as to impose economic sanctions.' 4 ' In-
deed, international peace bears a close relationship to the pro-
tection of human rights.
The concepts of human rights and fundamental freedom,
a second goal of the U.N. Charter, have gained international
acceptance. What started as a goal in the U.N. Charter and the
138. Id. art. 76. The League of Nations had a similar system, administered by
the permanent mandates commission. See Humphrey, supra note 116, at 2.
139. A short list of "regional" wars would include: the Korean War, the Viet-
nam War, and the Iran-Iraq war, as well as various battles in the Middle East, Eastern
Europe, and Africa.
140. See INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 116, at 391 (citing G.A. Res.
1760, 17 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) 3, U.N. Doc. A/5517 (1962)).
141. See S.C. Res. 253, 23 U.N. SCOR at 5, U.N. Doc. S/INF/23/Rev.l (1968);
S.C. Res. 232, 21 U.N. SCOR at 7, U.N. Doc. S/INF/21/Rev.1 (1966).
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights 4 ' has developed into
numerous treaties and conventions giving greater definition
and legal weight to the concept of human rights.' 43 While the
exact contours of the individual rights to be legally protected
remains hotly debated,'4 4 the very existence of the treaties, the
regional and international human rights mechanisms, and the
debate itself show the clear expansion of the kinds of matters
now considered human rights concerns.' 4 5
Finally, the modern legacy of the third goal of establishing
formal equality and self-determination as articulated in the
U.N. Charter has been a decline in European hegemony. The
expected bureaucratization of colonization has been par-
tially 146 undermined by the increase in liberation wars and the
ultimate decolonization of primarily African states at a fairly
rapid pace. "4 7 These new, so-called "Third World" countries
have created their own alliances based upon different cultural
and economic perspectives-for example, the non-aligned
states 14 and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries ("OPEC")-and have injected themselves into the largely
European-dominated arena of superpower politics. Conse-
quently, the international arena has taken on a diverse and
142. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. Doc. A/
810, at 71 (1948); see Humphrey, supra note 116, at 6-7.
143. See INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS (R. Lillich ed. 1986) (con-
taining 49 international human rights treaties, agreements, and other instruments).
144. See McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, The Protection of Respect and Human Rights:
Freedom of Choice and World Public Order, 24 AM. U.L. REV. 919 (1975).
145. See generally L. GOODRICH, THE UNITED NATIONS IN A CHANGING WORLD
159-78 (1974) (detailing development of Human Rights Protection since existence ol
U.N. Charter).
146. The author uses the term "partially" because the Trusteeship Council con-
tinues to function, and there remain a number of countries, such as Namibia, who are
still in the process of acquiring their independence. But cf. Wren, An Early Indepen-
dence Is Now Seen for Namibia, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1990, at A6, col. 1 (stating that
Namibian independence could be proclaimed by mid-March, 1990).
147. See generally U. SUD, DECOLONIZATION TO WORLD ORDER: INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS AND THE EMERGING PATrERN OF GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE (1983)
(discussing international organizations, colonialism, and decolonization).
148. See generally R.JACKSON, THE NON-ALIGNED, THE UN AND THE SUPERPOWERS
(1986) (defining non-alignment and describing the origins and evolution of the non-
aligned movement); Statement by His Excellency General Soeharto, President of the
Republic of Indonesia, Head of the Indonesian Delegation to the Summit Meeting of
the Third Conference of Non-Aligned Countries (Lusaka, 1970) (describing history
of conferences between non-aligned countries, general policy of non-alignment, and
future goals for non-aligned countries).
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multicultural character that is, and should be, increasingly re-
flected in international law. 149 The historical development of
the three U.N. Charter goals sets the context for amending the
definition of refugee.
B. The Application of the Goals of the U.N. Charter to the Expanded
Definition of Refugee
The argument set forth in this Article for amending the
international definition of refugee coincides with the underly-
ing concern of the United Nations for world harmony. First
and foremost, if an expanded definition of refugee is to prove
successful in alleviating burdens for both refugees and receiv-
ing countries, international cooperation is essential.
One could imagine a "free market" mode of international
relations wherein each country acted solely with its own inter-
ests in mind. One might expect or hope that from this a ra-
tional international order would develop. This Article, how-
ever, subscribes to the view that the historical international
149. This need for a multicultural or diverse perspective in international law is
also reflected in the private international law arena, especially in international con-
tracts. See Patterson, United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods: Unification and the Tension Between Compromise and Domination, 22 STAN. J. INT'L L.
263, 267-70 (1986) (discussing lack of input of developing and socialist countries in
1964 Hague Conference at which Hague Conventions were adopted and suggesting
need for "broadening the base of participating countries"). The kinds of problems a
multicultural perspective in the contracts area embraces often affect different levels
of economic development. For example, in the debates on the U.N. Convention on
Contracts, developed and developing countries disagreed about the amount of time a
buyer has to notify a seller of a nonconformity and what the nature of the remedy
against a buyer who fails to comply with contract terms in a timely manner should be.
Id. at 289-93. The concern of the developing nations was that in buying highly tech-
nical equipment from developed nations, a buyer in a developing country might have
to wait one year for a qualified expert to examine the goods for defects, which might
be far too long a period of time from the developed country seller's perspectives. Id.
at 300-03. A compromise on this issue was eventually reached, but the existence of
such compromises over diverse perspectives has led to much debate over the -U.N.
Convention on Contracts itself. For supporting positions see Proposed United Nations
Convention on Contracts in the International Sale of Goods: Hearings on Treaty Doc., 98-9_Before
the Senate Comm. in Foreign Relations, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 77-82 (1984) (Statements/
letters of National Foreign Trade Council, American Association of Exporters' and
Importers and American Bar Association). For opposing views see id. at 73-76
(Statements of Armstrong World Industries and Professor Arthur Rosett) and
Rosett, Critical Reflections on the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods, 45 OHIo ST. L.J. 265 (1984).
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movement toward cooperation and away from the "free mar-
ket" mode is a positive and rational one.
. This is not, of course, to say that national self-interest has
disappeared. Rather, this Article recognizes and affirms the
idea that national self-interests are inextricably bound to and
furthered by coordinated international responses to world
concerns. Especially in the context of refugee concerns, a co-
ordinated international approach is the most rational. This is
true, in part, because concerns for individual human rights are
better handled when such matters are subject to international
scrutiny. The treatment by a state of its own nationals and ref-
ugees should be reviewed by the world community, rather than
leaving the treatment of individuals solely to domestic legisla-
tive and judicial mechanisms (that may or may not exist) within
the country in which those individuals reside or of which they
are citizens.15 0 Moreover, such an approach is more rational
for refugees because once an individual flees across a state
border the problem becomes inherently international in scope.
Accordingly, an international solution seems the most appro-
priate.' 5 1
An expanded definition of refugee is also consistent with
the three main goals of the U.N. Charter. A definition that in-
cludes victims of war and civil strife is consistent with the goals
of (1) maintaining peace through the monitoring and elimina-
tion of human rights violations; (2) advancing and expanding
human rights and fundamental freedoms; and (3) recognizing
a multicultural approach to international law in a world of
equal nations.
1. An Expanded Definition of Refugee
and the Goal of Peace
The goals of peace and human rights are intertwined. The
maintenance of peace includes monitoring human rights viola-
tions, which engender international tension and portend war.
Indeed, refugee influxes have been at the heart of certain wars.
150. See generally Humphrey, supra note 116, at 3-10 (discussing mid-20th cen-
tury changes in international law wrought by the rise of human rights law).
151. See R. Cox & H. JACOBSEN, THE ANATOMY OF INFLUENCE: DECISION-MAKING
IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 420-21 (1973). As these authors noted, "[l]f a task
is both essential and on an international scale, some international structure or organ-
ization must exist or be created to carry it out." Id. at 421.
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For example, the brief war between India and Pakistan in
1971 underscores the interrelationship between refugee in-
fluxes, gross human rights violations, and peace. The tensions
between India and Pakistan during this period were height-
ened due to the large flow of forced migrants fleeing Pakistan
into India and the failure of the international community to
classify these forced migrants as refugees. In 1947, the British
Parliament passed the India Independence Act creating both
Pakistan and an independent India. 15 2 Pakistan was comprised
of two separate parts. West Pakistan was populated primarily
by Urdu-speaking people who, although a minority, were eco-
nomically and militarily dominant over the majority Bengali-
speaking inhabitants of East Pakistan. 153 Ethnic conflicts in
Pakistan erupted in March 1971 after the first free elections in
October 1970. East Pakistan wanted its own country (Bangla-
desh)-an idea the government of Pakistan rejected.
Thousands of civilians were killed; the prime targets were op-
position politicians, students, professors, and Hindus. 154 From
this mixture of civil strife, gross human rights violations, and
political and ethnic persecution, millions of Pakistanis fled to
India. This influx of Pakistanis heightened pre-existing ten-
sions between India and Pakistan, leading to war on December
3, 1971, which resulted in the establishment of the separate
state of Bangladesh.' 55
There is still some question as to whether India would
have been ready and able to go to war without being able to
characterize the influx of Pakistanis as a civilian invasion.
156
The international community, however, merely watched and
failed to provide relief to refugees under the 1967 Protocol.
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
seemed to reject the notion that the "tragic events in East Paki-
stan" were racially based.157 Morover, despite an investigation
of the situation by the International Commission of Jurists,
152. Indian Independence Act, 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, ch. 30, § 1.
153. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 116, at 485.
154. Id. at 486.
155. Id.
156. See id. at 488 (noting characterization made by Indian representative at
United Nations).
157. Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 28
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 18) at 40-41, U.N. Doc. A/9018 (1973).
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which concluded that the actions of the Pakistani army against
Hindus and others constituted a violation of the U.N. Treaty
on Racial Discrimination, 58 the sheer numbers of Pakistanis-
ten million-would have made individual determinations as
envisioned by the 1967 Protocol impossible. Thus, the welfare
of the (ten million) Pakistanis who fled to India would have
been better met and the tensions between India and Pakistan
might have been reduced, rather than heightened, if the inter-
national community could have characterized these Pakistanis
as refugees under an internationally accepted definition.
The threat of instability, which massive influxes of refu-
gees pose, has been described in war-like terms in other situa-
tions. A Malaysian newspaper once noted that the influx of
Vietnamese refugees into Malaysia was "as much a weapon of
war as a softening-up raid by waves of bombers."' 5 9 Similarly,
commentators in the United States have described Cuban refu-
gees as "bullets aimed at this country."' 160 The causes of wars,
like the India-Pakistan conflict, are too complex to be com-
pletely prevented by prompt coordinated international re-
sponses to influxes of refugees, but in the spirit of the U.N.
Charter's maintenance of peace through monitoring interna-
tional "situations which might lead to a breach of the
peace," 161 international intervention in such a situation is an
essential response to prevent war.
2. An Expanded Definition of Refugee and the Goal of
Human Rights
The need to expand the definition of refugee is also in
keeping with the promotion of human rights. Human rights
principles are often violated when masses of individuals are
forced to flee because of war or civil strife. 162 As in the war
158. See INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, THE EVENTS IN EAST PAKISTAN,
1971, at 51-53, 81-82 (1972). See generally INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note
116, at 487 (noting that International Commission ofJurists called international con-
ference in 1971 to set up commission to inquire into events in East Pakistan). See also
International Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar.
7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
159. Garvey, supra note 12, at 486 (quoting New Straits Times (Malaysia) (June
1987)).
160. Id.
161. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1.
162. See Garvey, supra note 12, at 485 n. 17.
72 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 13:35
between India and Pakistan, whether ten million Pakistanis
were maimed and killed as a result of racial discrimination,
political persecution, or the effects of civil war, all ten million
have had fundamental rights and freedoms violated.1 6 3 By rec-
ognizing an international legal obligation to aid victims fleeing
war conditions, mechanisms intended to promote human
rights and fundamental freedoms would be advanced.
3. An Expanded Definition of Refugee and the Goal of
Formal Equality and Self-Determination
The expansion of the international legal obligation to aid
migrants who include war and civil strife victims is also sup-
ported by the goal of establishing formal equality and self-de-
termination. The U.N. Charter concept of formal equality en-
visions the legal equality of all nations large and small. The
concept of self-determination envisions that groups of cultur-
ally or religiously related people can aspire and attain a recog-
nition of their community, ultimately through the creation of
new sovereign states that will be respected equally. Expansion
of the international definition of refugee to include other cir-
cumstances that cause forced migration is consistent with these
goals. If all states are equal, then all of their experiences with
forced migrants should be considered and included in any in-
ternational definition that claims to respond to an interna-
tional, and not merely a regional, refugee crisis.
Arguably, such a vision of equality goes beyond mere for-
mal equality. Formal equality may demand that whatever
Western definition is developed, it be applied equally by all
countries. The United Nations, however, has caused the inter-
national community to adopt a multicultural view.
IV. THE BLENDING OF HISTORICAL EXPERIENCES
INTO A MULTICULTURAL VIEW
The modern legacy of the United Nations' goals has been
a decline in European hegemony and an increase in the mul-
ticultural character of international law. An expanded defini-
tion of refugee furthers these goals because by including not
only persecution, but also war and civil strife as legitimate
163. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, arts. 3, 5, G.A. Res. 217A,
U.N. Doc. A/810, at 72-73 (1948) (noting right to life and right to be free of torture).
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causes of forced migration, such a revised definition encom-
passes both the cause traditionally identified with the Euro-
pean experience and those causes identified with the African
and Asian experiences.
A. The European Concept of the "Nation-State"
Conceptually, the problem of refugees is of European ori-
gin. The notion of the "territorial state" or "nation-state" is a
product of European history.' 64 One corollary to the creation
of the nation-state was that the individual was defined in rela-
tion to these political divisions. People who identified with a
state and its territory were presumed to be protected by the
state even when away from it. In contrast, a state owed no re-
sponsibility to persons who left its territory if such persons
could not identify with such state. This refusal of states to ac-
cept responsibility for such "strangers" led to the develop-
ment of an international definition for refugees.
B. Non-Territorial Development in Africa
Despite the relatively recent adoption of territorial sover-
eignty by African nations, their peculiar history has affected
their attitude towards refugees. While territory, itself, has
been sometimes jealously guarded, people have not been asso-
ciated with a territory to the extent they have been in Euro-
pean experiences. African history is a product of community
relationships that are not territorially based.' 65
In pre-colonial Africa, the existence of nomadic peoples
164. See J. HERTZ, THE NATION-STATE AND THE CRISIS OF WORLD POLITICS 99-
123 (1976) (tracking rise and demise of territorial state). The concepts of sover-
eignty and nationalism developed with the establishment of international law. Id. at
111-12.
165. The author uses African history as a stark example because the expanded
definition of refugee originated in the African Convention. It is important to note,
however, that other so-called "Third World" nations also have histories far less de-
pendent on the concept of a territorial state. See, e.g., STUDIES IN THIRD WORLD SOCI-
ETIES, CONTEMPORARY NOMADIC AND PASTORALIST PEOPLES: AFRICA AND LATIN
AMERICA (1981) [hereinafter STUDIES IN THIRD WORLD SOCIETIES].
Chinese history also reveals that the concepts of nation-state and nationalism are
relatively new, having taken hold in the early twentieth century. See J. LEVENSON,
CONFUCIAN CHINA AND ITS MODERN FATE 98 (1968). There was always the concept of
kuo as a "local political unit," while it is now understood to encompass "the nation,"
in classical times the kuo was subordinate to a greater Chinese Empire, t'ien-hsia. This
conceptual empire went beyond territorial China and beyond the concept of territory
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whose lifestyle necessitated constant movement is a clear ex-
ample of the lack of dependence on a fixed territory in African
communities. For example, in pre-colonial West Africa, the
Fulani people were well known in oral and written history as
consisting of two groups: one with a nomadic lifestyle, herding
cattle, sheep, and goats and the other with a settled lifestyle,
serving as scholars, judges, and kings.' 6 6 Whereas the no-
madic group, the Fulanin daji, moved with their herds, the
other group, the Fulanin gida, settled to establish kingdoms by
the nineteenth century.' 67
In looking at the nomadic Fulani more closely, studies
have shown that their "disrespect" for territorial borders did
not make them "aliens" within the communities in which they
interacted. Rather, the Fulani, who moved to the Central Su-
dan as part of their customary search for pastures, by 1804,
had come to be regarded as equal citizens of that region.' 6 8
The Fulani were important contributors both economi-
cally and politically. Economically, they held a near monopoly
on the ownership of cattle, and thus, were the main suppliers
of meat, milk, butter, hides, and skins. 169 Politically, the Fulani
remained active both before and after the introduction of Is-
lam. 170
The Fulani are but one example of a number of nomadic
groups in Africa who, although mobile, developed complex so-
cial, political, and economic relationships with both their sed-
entary relatives and other groups.' 7 1 In African history, where
or political power to "the regime of value," the mark of "civilization" that tran-
scended boundaries. See id. at 98-99.
166. PASTORALISTS OF THE WEST AFRICAN SAVANNA XiV-XV (M. Adamu & A. Kirk-
Greene eds. 1986).
167. Id.
168. M. Adamu, The Role of the Fulani and Twareg Pastoralists in the Central Sudan,
1405-1903, in PASTORALISTS OF THE WEST AFRICAN SAVANNA, supra note 166, at 55-56.
169. Id. at 57. The Fulani cattle also supplied manure for use by the settled
farmers of the region. Id.
170. Id. at 58-59. The Fulani participated in the Islamic military reform cam-
paigns of the second half of the eighteenth century that led to the overthrow of the
existing governments and the establishment of emirs. Id. Many Fulani men were
chosen to fulfill the emir positions, Id. at 59. This actually led to many pastoralist
Fulani becoming sedentary. Id.
171. See generally PASTORALISTS OF THE WEST AFRICA SAVANNA, supra note 166
(examining historical perspectives, language, literature, and social and economic as-
pects of nomads in West Africa); STUDIES IN THIRD WORLD SOCIETIES, supra note 165
(examining different nomadic and pastoral groups in both Africa and Latin America).
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territorial boundaries were much more fluid than in the tradi-
tional nation-state construct, nomads were not mere visitors to
the communities through which they travelled.' 72 Often times
the nomads' herds were essential to the economic life of these
communities 73 and the nomads would also participate in the
political life of their communities. The responsibility of the
government to the individual, then, transcended territorial
borders.
In post-colonial African history, territorial sovereignty has
become a prominent issue. While African states after their in-
dependence have come to guard carefully their colonial bor-
ders, 74 these boundaries, drawn by the former colonial pow-
ers, reflected little, if any, attempt to consider "tribal" or eth-
nological factors. 75 People from a variety of different groups
were placed together under the banner and within the territory
of one state, while relatives in some of these same groups were
placed under a different banner and within the territory of a
different state. For example, one can see by following lan-
guage patterns that the aforementioned Fulani are now found
in contemporary Guinea, Upper Volta, Niger, and Nigeria. 76
Thus, these territorial divisions led African countries to absorb
refugees from neighboring countries. This African response
reveals why African states were not viewed as requiring
UNHCR aid in the early 1960s. During this time period, it was
172. The permeability of borders is now perceived as a problem by modern Af-
rican nation-states where minority communities of nomads continue to live in tradi-
tional ways. See PASTORALISTS OF THE WEST AFRICA SAVANNA, supra note 166, at xiii.
For similar concerns expressed in East Africa see STUDIES IN THIRD WORLD SOCIE-
TIES, supra note 165, at 16.
173. Some would argue that economic benefits provided on a consistent basis by
"foreigners" is not sufficient to establish "membership" in a community. A good
example would be the use of Mexican labor in the United States. Starting in 1942,
the United States entered into a series of agreements with Mexico for the temporary
importation of some four to five million Mexican agricultural workers under the
"Bracero Program." See T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTINS, supra note 11, at 175 n.a. The
program ended in 1964 but is believed to have created the current historical pattern
of Mexican migration and employment in the United States. Cardenas, United States
Immigration Policy Toward Mexico: An Historical Perspective, 2 CHICANO L. REV. 66, 79-80
(1975). Studies suggest that the continued use of agricultural labor in the Southwest-
ern United States indicates a need in foreign labor that is often satisfied through
extralegal channels. T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTINS, supra note 11, at 174 n.3.
174. See I. BROWNLIE, AFRICAN BOUNDARIES 7 (1979).
175. See, e.g., id at 6-7.
176. See PASTORALISTS OF THE WEST AFRICAN SAVANNA, supra note 166, at xv.
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the European states that became the primary recipients of
UNHCR aid. 1
77
An expanded definition of refugee that incorportates the
concept of territorial sovereignty as well as the notion of extra-
territorial responsibility would thereby reflect the contempo-
rary multicultural nature of international law.
V. THE PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AN EXPANDED
REFUGEE DEFINITION
The need to respond to current problems and the desire
to attain enunciated international goals necessitate that the in-
ternational community revise the definition of refugee to in-
clude victims of war and civil strife. There are, however, two
noteworthy arguments against such a revision. The first argu-
ment is based on the concern that there are insufficient na-
tional and international resources to aid these "extra" refu-
gees. The second argument is based on the concern that a
state's ability to conduct foreign policy would be impaired
were the definition of refugee to be revised.
A. Availability of National and International Resources
The concern with the sufficiency of existing funds to sup-
port an expanded definition of refugee implicates both the
state's moral obligation to help persons in need and its need to
protect its own sovereignty by conserving its limited social
services in order to maintain internal social tranquility. While
it may be desirable to expand international protection to in-
clude war victims, how can the international community afford
to do so? An unofficial, ad hoc expansion of international pro-
tection as urgent situations arise may be inconsistently applied,
but it may yet be the only way that each state can control the
costs of providing aid. When the combination of sufficient
economic resources and social acceptance align to make ac-
ceptance of any group of war victims practical, a state is al-
177. See E. NGOLLE, supra note 43, Table 23, at 115 (compiling statistics from
reports of the UNHCR (1963-1980)). While African refugees "spontaneously set-
tle," some studies indicate that the costs of absorption by ethnic or tribal groups is
very high. Kinship groups may absorb their relatives but the refugee relations may
live in extreme poverty and insecurity while going unnoticed by governments and
agencies. See L. ERIKSON, G. MELANDER & P. NOBEL, AN ANALYSING ACCOUNT OF THE
CONFERENCE ON THE AFRICAN REFUGEE PROBLEM 19-20 (May 1979).
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lowed and encouraged to accept such refugees. On the other
hand, when resources are scarce or native populations are hos-
tile to any particular group of refugees, a state is free to reject
such war victims without any concern for violating interna-
tional norms. It is the best that can be done given limited re-
sources.
There are, however, a number of responses to the limited
resources argument against expanding the definition of refu-
gee. In fact, the issue is not whether resources, national and
international, are unlimited, but rather whether resources
would be unduly stretched if victims of war and civil strife were
included in the international definition. One indication that
resources are sufficient is presented by the UNHCR's record of
expenditures, which reveals that much of its resources are al-
ready spent on victims of war and civil strife. With the propor-
tion of forced migrants fitting into the traditional 1967 Proto-
col definition decreasing and that of victims of war and civil
strife increasing, recognition of war and civil strife victims as
refugees would merely establish a legal obligation to aid these
forced migrants.
Even if resources would be strained, the international
community should not ignore the needs of increasing numbers
of victims of war and civil strife. One could seek to balance the
seriousness of the nature of limited resources with the recogni-
tion of the equally imperative moral claim of war victims on
international resources. For example, the UNHCR has sug-
gested that refugees covered by the "wider concept" might not
be entitled to the full panoply of rights enjoyed by those refu-
gees covered under the 1967 Protocol.' Under the 1967 Pro-
tocol, refugees are entitled to certain rights-sometimes on a
par with nationals and sometimes only on a par with other
aliens-that allow the refugee to settle to some degree in the
country of refuge. 79 One way to reduce national costs while
still accommodating these refugees would be to modify some
of the rights granted under the 1967 Protocol as they apply to
victims of war and civil strife.
178. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
179. See 1967 Protocol, supra note 4, art. I(l), 19 U.S.T. 6223, 6225, T.I.A.S. No.
6577, at 39, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, 268 (adopting articles 2-34 of 1951 Convention);
1951 Convention, supra note 3, arts. 2-34, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, 156-76.
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Some rights accorded under the terms of the 195,1 Con-
vention and the 1967 Protocol such as freedom of religion 80
and protection of artistic rights18 ' cost little for the host gov-
ernment and should remain intact. The maintenance of other
rights, however, may be costly for the host country. The first
of the two most obvious examples is article 17, concerning
wage-earning employment.' 8 2  Article 17 recognizes states'
concern with protecting their national labor market by not re-
quiring that refugees be treated as nationals automatically. In-
stead, states may treat refugees as they would treat other
aliens, unless certain conditions are met.' 8 3 Section 2 of article
17 provides that restrictive measures imposed on aliens be
lifted if the alien fulfills one of the following conditions:
a) He has completed three years' residence in the country;
b) He has a spouse possessing the nationality of the coun-
try of residence. A refugee may not invoke the benefit of
this provision if he has abandoned his spouse; [or]
c) He has one or more children possessing the nationality
of the country of residence.' 84
One way to alleviate the possible burden caused by an in-
flux of refugees due to war and civil strife would be not to give
these refugees the benefits of this section. It could be argued
that victims of war and civil strife should be considered tempo-
rary visitors in a way that persecution victims are not, because
one could logically expect that an internal or external war
would end long before the erosion of the prejudices that are at
the root of persecution. Victims of war and civil strife would,
accordingly, be entitled to only a minimum temporary refugee
180. 1967 Protocol, supra note 4, art. 1(l), 19 U.S.T. at 6225, T.I.A.S. No. 6577,
at 39, 606 U.N.T.S. at 268 (adopting articles 2-34 of 1951 Convention); 1951 Con-
vention, supra note 3, art. 4, 189 U.N.T.S. at 156, 158.
181. 1967 Protocol, supra note 4, art. I(l), 19 U.S.T. at 6225, T.I.A.S. No. 6577,
at 39, 606 U.N.T.S. at 268 (adopting articles 2-34 of 1951 Convention); 1951 Con-
vention, supra note 3, art. 14, 189 U.N.T.S. at 162.
182. 1967 Protocol, supra note 4, art. I(l), 19 U.S.T. at 6225, T.I.A.S. No. 6577,
at 39, 606 U.N.T.S. at 268 (adopting articles 2-34 of 1951 Convention); 1951 Con-
vention, supra note 3, art. 17, 189 U.N.T.S. at 164.
183. 1967 Protocol, supra note 4, art. 1(l), 19 U.S.T. at 6225, T.I.A.S. No. 6577,
at 39, 606 U.N.T.S. at 268 (adopting articles 2-34 of 1951 Convention); 1951 Con-
vention, supra note 3, art. 17, § 1, 189 U.N.T.S. at 164.
184. 1967 Protocol, supra note 4, art. 1(l), 19 U.S.T. 6223, 6225, T.I.A.S. No.
6577, at 39, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, 268 (adopting articles 2-34 of 1951 Convention);
1951 Convention, supra note 3, art. 17, § 2, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, 164.
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status, such as a place to stay with food and shelter, but no
right to work.
Wars, however, can continue for years, and the more hu-
manitarian approach might be to allow these victims of war
and civil strife to work on a par with other refugees, but with-
out an automatic lifting of restrictions after three years. In-
stead, conditions in the refugees home country could be re-
viewed to determine whether a safe and voluntary repatriation
were possible. 85 A much longer period of time could be re-
quired before the benefits of residency were granted.
In a similar vein, the host country can control costs by not
automatically lifting restrictions on those refugees who have
married nationals. Requirements on the length of the mar-
riage or an inquiry into its "validity"-that it was not entered
into for immigration benefits-could be employed. 86 Such re-
quirements or investigations would arguably cost less than
providing social services to these refugees.
The second costly guarantee of rights is contained in arti-
cle 23, which requires that refugees receive the same public
relief and assistance as nationals. 87 When public assistance,
even in wealthy countries, is at the subsistence level, it is diffi-
185. While a detailed discussion of a tiered system of the rights accorded to
refugees is beyond the scope of this Article, it is important to note that a review of
conditions in the exporting country would need to rely upon a variety of different
sources. For example, in the United States, the U.S. Department of State Human
Rights Annual Report might be one source. Reports from governmental organiza-
tions interested in refugees or human rights concerns, such as Amnesty Interna-
tional, would be essential. In addition, information from both the government of the
exporting state and any opposition sources within that country would also be neces-
sary. The multiple sources requirement would avoid allowing a receiving govern-
ment to claim that conditions had improved for political purposes. Analogous con-
cerns have been raised in the United States in immigration proceedings where refu-
gee determinations are made. Immigration judges are required to assess the
objective basis for an alien's "well-founded fear" of persecution, in some cases rely-
ing upon brief State Department letters stating that "the situation has improved,"
when other sources give detailed accounts of human rights abuses. See, e.g., Note,
Salvadoran Illegal Aliens, A Struggle to Obtain Refuge in the United States, supra note 10, at
304-07, 326-27 (discussing difficulty encountered by Salvadorans seeking asylum
based on assertions of disruptive conditions in El Salvador contrasted with advice
given by U.S. State Department to U.S. travellers to El Salvador on expected dan-
gers).
186. Such requirements are used in U.S. immigration law. See, e.g. Immigration
Marriage Fraud Ammendments of 1986, Pub. L. 99-639, 100 Stat. 3537 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1988)).
187. 1967 Protocol, supra note 4, art 1(1), 19 U.S.T. 6223, 6225, T.I.A.S. No.
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cult to see how a reduction in expenses can be made by modi-
fying this requirement. One solution would be to establish ref-
ugee camps. Camps have been used extensively in refugee
assistance programs.' 88 The virtue of the use of camps is two-
fold. First, public assistance costs can be reduced because pro-
visions can be supplied in mass quantities. Indeed, it would be
easier to receive and to distribute the resources from the
UNHCR or from other governmental or charitable organiza-
tional resources to an essentially captive population than if
such resources were to be distributed selectively as between
nationals and refugees. Second, camps prevent any competi-
tion between refugees and nationals for jobs and the attendant
social dislocation that can accompany competition between na-
tionals and refugees for jobs or other scarce resources.
The drawbacks of camps are obvious. A captive popula-
tion of "second class citizens" is an easy target when limited
resources must be cut, especially in a country with economic
troubles. These refugees are people without any political
voice who may have few allies in positions of power. Condi-
tions could, and have, become atrocious in certain camps.' 89
In addition, there is the issue of how long refugees would be
required to stay in such camps. Even if conditions were not
terrible, a prison-like existence in a camp would be intolerable
for any extended period of time. One could imagine the kind
of situation that the United States faced after the great influx
of Cuban Marielitos after 1980. From April through Septem-
ber, 1980, a Cuban exodus took place, resulting in the arrival
of more than 120,000 Cubans in the ports of Florida. 9 0
Although many were granted asylum and released, by 1987
6577, at 39, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, 268 (adopting articles 2-34 of 1951 Convention);
1951 Convention, supra note 3, art. 23, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, 168.
188. See, e.g., I L. HOLBORN, supra note 8, at 468-75 (reviewing UNHCR pro-
grams after 1958 and discussing Camp Clearance Program designed to resettle refu-
gees, and need for aid to refugees outside of camps); see also H. CHRISTENSEN, SUR-
VIVAL STRATEGIES FOR AND BY CAMP REFUGEES (United Nations Research Institute for
Social Development Report No. 823 1982) (reporting on situation in refugee camps
in Somalia).
189. See, e.g., Temporary Suspension of Deportation of Certain Aliens, Hearing on H.R.
4447 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. at 55 (1984) (statement of the Honorable
Sam Gejdensen, Connecticut Congressional representative, describing overcrowded,
disease-ridden camps in Latin America).
190. See Reuters International News, Sept. 28, 1980 (noting halt in flow of
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some 6,800 remained incarcerated indefinitely because of their
criminal records, although some of their crimes were relatively
minor.' 9 ' Although Cuban Marielitos may be classified as refu-
gees under the traditional definition because of persecution, a
war may continue for many years, and refugees who flee such a
war may find themselves in indefinite detention.
A grant of settlement rights to war and civil strife refugees
might alleviate some of the problems associated with refugee
camps. Initially, such refugees would be entitled at a minimum
to a safe haven-a camp with food and shelter, safe from
bombings, bullets, and torture. Receiving states would then be
required to review, on a regular basis, the status of conditions
in the country at war or in conflict. If conditions did not im-
prove, then the rights outlined in the 1967 Protocol would
gradually be introduced. Refugees would either be slowly in-
corporated into the society of the receiving state or moved to
other countries. Refugees would not face indefinite detention
and receiving countries would have time either to introduce
these new refugees into the country or to work with the
UNHCR and other countries to make alternate arrangements.
One way to maximize the prospect of a state receiving
help from other countries would be to interpret a state's legal
obligation to refugees in a broader fashion. Typically, when
one thinks of the traditional refugee protected by the 1967
Protocol, the rights follow the individual. When an alien ar-
rives at the borders or in the territory of a particular receiving
state, the alien is entitled to a determination of refugee status.
If the state grants refugee status, the particular receiving state
owes the refugee certain obligations as outlined in the 1967
Protocol. 92 If a new legal obligation to all refugees were im-
Cubans into United States that began in April after arrival of more than 120,000
Cubans arrived in United States since flow began).
19 1. See generally Audet, Representing the Institutionalized Mariel Cubans-The Wiscon-
sin Experience, 1987 Wis. L. REV. 455, 459 (citing to Volsky, Clamor Rises Over Detention
of Cuban Refugees by U.S., N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 1987, at A23, col. 4, stating that some
of these Cuban Marielitos had been guilty of offenses as minor as stealing sheep).
192. Two points are important here. First, if a state has not signed and ratified
the 1951 Convention or 1967 Protocol, then it is technically under no legal obliga-
tion to provide anything, unless an argument can be made that some or all of the
rights in either of these instruments has passed into customary law and thus apply to
all states regardless of whether the state has signed the document.
The second point is that even after a state signs and ratifies one of the instru-
ments, the state may have certain domestic procedures to follow in order to create
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posed on both receiving and non-receiving states, even if a
state had few or no refugees at its border, it could be required
by such a broad obligation to provide other kinds of assistance,
such as money or food, either to the UNHCR or directly to
over-burdened receiving states.
Such a broad obligation would be radically different from
the traditional obligation imposed on states to aid refugees.
Although a portion of the U.N. General Assembly's budget is
allocated to fund the UNHCR, creating a situation where
states, by paying their U.N. dues, contribute indirectly to the
UNHCR, the majority of UNHCR funds come from the direct
voluntary contributions of states. A broader obligation would
make some portion of these voluntary contributions involun-
tary.
The disadvantages of a proposition that entails expanding
the legal definition of refugee and the breadth of the legal obli-
gation towards refugees are clear. A convention that requires
a specific amount of money from states parties, even if it were
defined as a percentage of some economic measurement such
as gross national product, would not easily gain broad accept-
ance. Although a state might be willing to contribute volunta-
rily an amount it determined affordable, it might balk at having
an international forum determine the amount of its obligation.
On the other hand, the proposition has its advantages.
Aside from truly sharing the burden of refugees internation-
ally, it also has the practical advantage of sparing the most eco-
nomically vulnerable of the world's countries the prospect of
handling the refugee burdens on just their own resources. Be-
cause the bulk of contemporary refugees originates in African
and Asian countries, and because these refugees also tend to
flee to neighboring African and Asian countries, a broad obli-
gation on the part of all states would alleviate the burden en-
domestic law which embodies the international requirements provided in the instru-
ment. For example, in the United States, some scholars argue that without such en-
abling statutes, treaty law and customary international law are unenforceable, for the
most part, in domestic courts. See Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International
Law, 33 UCLA L. REV. 665 (1986). This would mean that even if a state had signed
the 1951 Convention or 1967 Protocol, if it had passed no legislation, a legitimate
refugee could be denied rights without any recourse in domestic courts. The state
would be in violation of international law and other states could take various diplo-
matic steps to censure the state, but the individual refugee would have no legal basis
for challenging the state's acts.
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countered by those receiving states that are least able to pro-
vide for their own citizens as well as refugees.
The development of international institutions to coordi-
nate aid for refugees would demonstrate a recognition of the
international nature of the refugee problem and the need for
international solutions. Without such a broad legal obligation,
the solution is not an international one, but rather, a "ghetto-
ized" one in whatever areas of the world are experiencing so-
cial dislocation through either persecution or war-like condi-
tions.
While the advantages of such a radical re-conception of
responsibility for refugees are many, this Article does not take
that path. The virtue of merely expanding the definition of ref-
ugee within the traditional conception of responsibility to refu-
gees is precisely that far from being a radical break; it is a logi-
cal outgrowth of both the need to respond in some way to
growing numbers of forced migrants who flee war and the
need to integrate international law with'the history and tradi-
tions of sovereign states.
The issue of adequate resources for an expanded defini-
tion of refugee that includes victims of war and civil strife is a
serious one. But, as has been explored, there are a variety of
ways to imagine conserving or pooling resources in the event
that an expansion of the definition actually engendered a sig-
nificant increase in the numbers of refugees. A tiered ap-
proach, however, giving migrants of war and civil strife only a
portion of the assistance commanded by persecution victims
and gradually increasing that assistance over time, is a practical
necessity and should not detract from the premise of this Arti-
cle that vicitms of war and civil strife have the same moral
claim to international aid as do victims of persecution. The
important point here is that the reasons and needs for ex-
panding the definition outweigh a simple "it will cost too
much" argument and must be met with creative approaches to
managing costs before facing the option of standing by while
innocent people die.
B. Foreign Policy Implications of Aiding Refugees
The second objection to expanding the definition of refu-
gees to include victims of war and civil strife is that a state's
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ability to conduct its foreign policy will be hampered if it is
required to accept certain forced migrants. The argument is
that when a state admits a refugee into its territory it is making
a negative statement about the country from which the refugee
originates. If the country from which the refugee flees and the
receiving country are enemies their may be no concern. But if
the two states are friendly, such a negative statement could
have adverse foreign policy repercussions. 193 Accordingly, the
choice of granting refugee status may be necessary for states to
conduct freely their own foreign affairs.
This concern also arises, however, with regard to refugees
that flee another country because of persecution. While na-
tional interests can never be excluded from international rela-
tions, international law is and should be designed to set some
limits on the manner in which states conduct their interna-
tional affairs. Because the 1967 Protocol definition of refugee
already imposes such limits on foreign policy considerations,
an expanded definition of refugee should similarly be an ac-
ceptable constraint.
Indeed, victims of war and civil strife arguably implicate
such foreign policy considerations to a lesser extent than do
persecution victims, and consequently, the expanded defini-
tion, by creating a legal obligation, may depoliticize the act of
accepting refugees.'9 4 The expanded definition would loosen
193. See, e.g., Teitlbaum, Immigration, Refugees, and Foreign Policy, 38 INT'L ORG.
429, 439 (1984). This concern was addressed by one commentator, who discussed
the views expressed by critics of U.S. refugee policies under President Ronald Rea-
gan with regard to Salvadoran refugees. Id. (quoting 1982 Memorandum from the
Central American Refugee Center on Foreign Policy). This commentator noted spe-
cifically that the United States could not acknowledge human rights violations such as
persecution existing in an allied country, and that the United States did not want to
insult El Salvador by making such accusations. Id.; see Note, Salvador an Illegal Aliens:
A Struggle to Obtain Refuge in the United States, supra note 10, at 318. This concern has
also been expressed by U.S. officials with respect to Haitian refugees:
[T]here is no question that the flood of asylum claimants presents extremely
difficult problems for immigration law and policy. Most come not from the
Soviet bloc but from nations with which the United States has, or until re-
cently had, close political ties. These nations, such as Haiti and El Salvador,
would bitterly resent our granting asylum to their citizens.
Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 40 (1984).
194. This was something the African Convention intended to do as well,
describing the grant of asylum as "a peaceful and humanitarian act [that] shall not be
regarded as an unfriendly act by any Member State." African Convention, supra note
1, art. II, § 2, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45, 48.
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the political bind felt by a state confronted with a refugee from
a friendly state seeking refuge from civil war. Politically, it may
well be easier to recognize that one's ally is in the throes of a
civil war or under siege from some other aggressive state than
to identify that ally as a state that persecutes its own citizens.
Expanding the definition of refugees to include victims of
war and civil strife is feasible. Although such aid entails certain
costs there are a number of creative ways to minimize costs
without ignoring the plight of thousands of individuals. For-
eign policy considerations are also important, but, as illus-
trated, expanding the definition produces no greater encroach-
ment upon national sovereignty than does the current defini-
tion. In fact, an expansion of the definition would make it less
politically compromising for countries to provide aid to refu-
gees from war-torn countries.
VI. CONCLUSION
The international legal definition of refugee should be ex-
panded to include those individuals and groups who flee war
and civil strife, as provided in the African Convention. This
expansion should occur for several reasons. First, the expan-
sion should occur because the office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees has been progressively in-
cluding such war victims within its assistance programs. Legal-
izing the expansion would provide consistent and necessary
aid to those in need. Second, the expansion should occur be-
cause the causes of forced migration have changed, and refu-
gees fleeing war and civil strife now account for the greatest
proportion of forced migrants. Third, such an expansion is
consistent with the goals of the international community as set
out in the U.N. Charter. Fourth, the expansion should occur
because refusing to expand the definition of refugee indicates
a refusal to accept today's increasingly important multicultural
perspective, which blends the historical perspectives and ex-
periences of both developed and developing states. Finally,
such an expansion of the international refugee definition is ec-
onomically and politically feasible. The costs can be managed
by' employing creative solutions, and foreign policy tensions
ehcountered by states confronted with refugees would be
eased by expanding the refugee definition.
